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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Does the evidence support a finding that Elsie 
Brinkerhoff has been incompetent since 1970, and if so, does 
the evidence support a finding that all documents signed by her 
thereafter should be canceled and declared to be null and void? 
2. What is the legal effect of the fact that during the 
first day of trial, the court determined that the interests of 
Elsie Brinkerhoff were not being fully protected by her legal 
counsel, Willard R. Bishop, that she needed separate counsel to 
represent her interests, and that the court thereafter 
continued the trial without obtaining counsel to represent 
Elsie Brinkerhoff during the course of the trial? 
3. Assuming the incompetency of Elsie Brinkerhoff in 
1970, does the record support a finding that Elsie Brinkerhoff 
thereafter remained incompetent, including the years 1979, 1980 
and 1982 when she signed documents of conveyance? 
4. Did the 1966 contract terminate by operation of lav/, 
abandonment, rescission or mutual agreement by reason of the 
buyers' failure tc make payments thereunder from 1966 through 
1971 and thereafter executing documents of conveyance? 
5. Does the fact that Plaintiffs failed to tender at the 
time of trial the $30,000 that they acknowledged to be due and 
owing, prohibit the trial court from granting a Decree of 
Specific Performance under the contract and against an 
incompetent person. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by Defendants/Appellants, Golda B. 
Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff and Arlene B. Goulding (hereinafter 
"Defendants") from a judgment rendered after a trial on the 
merits by the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, District Court Judge of 
the Sixth Judicial District Court in and for Kane County, State 
of Utah, dated February 20th, 198 6. The judgment was in favor 
of Plaintiffs, Mont R. Anderson, Lena Brinkerhoff and Mark J. 
Brinkerhoff (hereinafter "Plaintiffs") and against Defendants 
specifically enforcing a 1966 contract and allowing Plaintiffs 
to make up past due payments of principal and interest in 
excess of $50,000 of an original contract wherein the total 
purchase price was $53,388, without interest. The judgment 
also voided all documents signed by Defendant Elsie 
Brinkerhoff, including those running in favor of Defendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
THE PARTIES 
Plaintiff, Mont R. Anderson, is the personal 
representative of the estate of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff, also 
known as "Tine" Brinkerhoff. He is the son-in-law of 
Plaintiff, Lena Brinkerhoff. He was also the accountant for 
the partnership consisting of Mark Brinkerhoff and Cloyd 
Brinkerhoff. Lena Brinkerhoff was married to Cloyd H. 
Brinkerhoff at the time of his death in October of 1979. Mark 
J. Brinkerhoff is the son of Elsie Brinkerhoff and the brother-
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in-law of Lena Brinkerhoff. Elsie Brinkerhoff is the mother of 
Mark, Cloyd, Golda B. Adair, Warren ("Tink") Brinkerhoff, 
Arlene B. Goulding, Charles Brinkerhoff and Betty B. Esplin. 
Defendant, Golda B. Adair is married to Webster Adair. They 
are the parents of Brad Adair. Webster Adair and Plaintiff, 
Lena Brinkerhoff, are brother and sister. 
THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION 
The real property which is the subject of this action 
consists of 1,956.17 acres of grazing ground, and 18.01 acres 
of farm ground. The property is located north and east of 
Glendale, Kane County, Utah, and has been in the Brinkerhoff 
family for many years. At the time of trial the property had 
an appraised value of $409,999. (Exhibit 37). Elsie 
Brinkerhoff received the property from the estate of her 
husband, Merle Brinkerhoff. The Brinkerhoff property also 
consists of some water rights in the Arizona Strip area and 
additional grazing and water rights. 
FACTS 
After Elsie Brinkerhoff received the property from her 
husband's estate, she entered into an agreement in 1966 betv/een 
herself as the seller and her sons, Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and 
Mark Brinkerhoff, as buyers. (Exhibit 1, attached). The 
contract was prepared by Ken Chamberlain, Attorney at Law, of 
Richfield, Utah. The contract requires the buyers (Mark and 
Cloyd) to pay to seller (Elsie) minimally the sum of $53,388, 
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at the rate of $2,000 per year for her life without interest 
and is an annuity contract based on the life expectancy of 
Elsie who was 65 years old at the time the contract was entered 
into. The contract required that an escrow be established and 
that deeds be deposited in the escrow. Only some of the deeds 
required by the 1966 contract were deposited into escrow, and 
the location or existence of all the original deeds was never 
established. The escrow, as per the agreement, was to be 
established in the Hurricane Branch of the Bank of St. George. 
In the event of a default, the contract does not require 
the seller to provide notice to the buyer of the default, but 
simply allows the seller to demand a redelivery to her of all 
the escrow documents, thus requiring the buyer to vacate and 
peaceably surrender all of the property described in the 
contract, with all sums paid to date to be forfeited as 
liquidated damages. The contract only requires prior notice 
for a default of the contract other than payment of principal 
and interest, and in that event, the buyer has a thirty (30) 
day grace period. However, as to payment of principal and 
interest, no prior written notice to cure is required. 
The contract also provides that the buyers are entitled to 
possession of the subject property only if they are in 
compliance with the terms of the agreement, including payment 
of principal and interest. (Exhibit 1). 
Even though the contract was not signed until 1966, an 
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annual payment for both 1964 and. 1965 was required under the 
contract. The trial court gave the buyers credit for these two 
annual payments inasmuch as the contract recites that the 
seller therein acknowledged payment of the same. 
The court found that all payments were made outside the 
escrow and that payments should have been made from 1964 in the 
sum of $2,000 per year. Including the 1985 payment, the court 
found that principal payments should have totaled $44,000 (22 
years at $2,000 per year) , and the court, even though the 
contract waives interest, assessed interest. The court found 
that from 1964 through trial, Plaintiffs had only paid 
$14,996.75 of the $44,000 which was due. Of the $14,996.75 
paid, $4,000 was paid after the litigation was filed. 
(Findings of Fact, No. 9, attached, R. 633). The court found 
that payments were made as follows: 
Date Paid 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
Amount 
$ 2,000.00 
2,000.00 
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
1,210.75 
1,780.00 
500.00 
Date Paid 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
SUBTOTAL: 
1983 (after 
litigation 
filed) 
1984 (after 
litigation 
filed) 
TOTAL PAID AT TIME OF TRIAL: 
$ 
$ 
$ 
Amount 
1,100.00 
400.00 
-0-
-0-
2,006.00 
-0-
-0-
-0-
10,996.85 
2,000.00 
2,000.00 
14,996.75 
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The trial court found that Mark Brinkerhoff and the estate 
of Cloyd Brinkerhoff were indebted to their mother, Elsie 
Brinkerhoff, in the sum of $50,262.95 including interest and 
allowed them to reinstate the contract upon payment of said 
amount. (Finding of Fact No. 13, R. 638). 
From 1964 through 1977, Elsie should have been paid 
$28,000. During that period of time, the court found that she 
was only paid $8,990.75, or thirty-two (32%) percent of the 
amount the trial court found was due and owing. Of significance 
is the fact that in 1977, Cloyd deceived his mother and had her 
sign a receipt stating that she had received $23,000 (Exhibit 4, 
attached) , even though he knew in reality that less than 
one-third of the amount owed at that time had been paid. (Tr. 
208-209) . Cloyd was told by Mont Anderson, a Certified Public 
Accountant, that he needed evidence that payment in that amount 
had been made, presumably to insulate himself and Mark from 
attack by the Internal Revenue Service. (Tr. 208). 
From 1966 through 1979, Mark and Cloyd operated as a 
partnership and have filed income tax returns as a partnership 
for that period of time. (Exhibits 26 and 39, Partnership 
Accounting Records; Tr. 96; 165). Cloyd died on October 14th, 
1979 of a sudden heart attack. 
Plaintiff Mont R. Anderson, is a Certified Public 
Accountant as well as the personal representative of the estate 
of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff. Mr. Anderson tried to convince the 
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trial court that Plaintiffs should have received credit for 
$38,012,34 (Tr. 166; Exhibit 22), under" highly questionable 
accounting practice, but even assuming that amount of credit, he 
testified that the sum of $15,000 was still past due and owing. 
At trial, Mark testified he owed his mother about $30,000 but 
had never offered to pay her any amount toward the past due 
payments. (Tr. 90-91, Tr. 166-167) . None of the Plaintiffs, 
prior to or at the time of trial, tendered to the court or Elsie 
Brinkerhoff any amount of arrearage, and specifically not the 
sum of $30,000 that even Plaintiffs acknowledged was due and. 
owing. 
In 1979 Mont Anderson recommended that Cloyd consult with 
an attorney in Nevada to get his affairs in order (Tr. 221), and 
Cloyd consulted with a law firm in Las Vegas, Nevada where 
Plaintiff Mont Anderson, resides. At the same time, Mont R. 
Anderson, recommended to Cloyd that he obtain a deed for the 
subject property and get it recorded. (Tr. 220) . Mark knew 
that Cloyd was having this legal work done. (Tr.. 119) . 
Apparently, someone suggested to Cloyd that he have a joint 
tenancy deed prepared between his mother, himself and his 
brother, Mark, for the subject property. Some time prior to 
June of 1979, Cloyd contacted Brad Adair (Elsie's grandson) who 
was employed by Southern Utah Title Company in Kanab, Utah. 
Cloyd asked Brad Adair to prepare a deed for the subject 
property from Elsie as the grantor to Elsie, Cloyd, and Mark as 
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joint tenants. (Tr. 434-441). Brad complied with that request, 
took the deed to Elsie who signed the same and Brad notarized 
her signature. (Exhibit 5, attached) . At the same time, Brad 
Adair also prepared another deed from Elsie to her son Charles, 
for property not related to the subject property. These two 
deeds were recorded one right after the other in the official 
records Of Kane County, Utah. (Tr. 434-444; see also Exhibit 
19, Entry Book, Recorder's Office, Kane County, Utah). The cost 
of $18.00 to record the joint tenancy deed was paid by 
partnership funds (Exhibits 19 and 39; see discussion, infra). 
Mr. Adair also testified that he believed his grandmother, Elsie 
Brinkerhoff, was competent on June 4th, 1979 and likewise in 
1980. (Tr. 447-448) . 
While Mark Brinkerhoff denied having knowledge of the 
preparation and recordation of the joint tenancy deed, it is 
obvious that both Cloyd and Mark were anticipating that their 
aged mother, Elsie, would predecease them and title would be 
vested in them as the surviving joint tenants. As sometimes 
happens, the events did not occur as anticipated, and on October 
14th, 1979, just four months after the execution and recordation 
of the joint tenancy deed, Cloyd Brinkerhoff died of a sudden 
heart attack. Within three or four months after Cloyd's death 
in 1979, Elsie gave Mark a copy of the joint tenancy deed 
(Tr.118), but Mark took no action to have it set aside until 
1982 when this lawsuit was filed naming him as a Defendant. In 
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1979 record title was vested in Elsie Brinkerhoff and Mark 
Brinkerhoff each with an undivided one-half interest. 
At the beginning of trial and when he testified, Mark took 
the position that he was entitled to a one-half interest in the 
subject property either by reason of the joint tenancy deed, or 
the 1966 Contract of Sale. (Tr. 104; 131). He essentially had 
nothing to lose by taking that position. Of significance is the 
fact that Mark has always recognized the validity of the joint 
tenancy deed. It is evident that he and his sister-in-law, Lena 
Brinkerhoff, had trouble over the ownership of the property by 
reason of that claim. (Tr. 112). This is evidenced by the fact 
that in the original complaint, Lena brought suit against Mark 
J. Brinkerhoff, Elsie Brinkerhoff and the remaining children as 
named Defendants, to cancel the joint tenancy deed that Mark and 
the other family members were relying on. (R. 1-8 Complaint; 
R.351-370 Seconded Amended Complaint). 
Both before and after Cloyd's death, it was evident to the 
other family members that their mother, Elsie Brinkerhoff, was 
not being paid the sum of $2,000 per year, and that she had not 
been paid that amount for many years. (Tr. 276). 
Some of the family members knew of the joint tenancy deed 
so after Cloyd's death, a family meeting was called. Since it 
was evident at that time that Elsie could not rely upon the 
$2,000 annual payment she was supposed to be receiving from her 
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two eldest sons, Defendants Golda, Warren, Arlene, Charles and 
Betty talked with their mother and they decided upon a method 
whereby Elsie would be guaranteed a minimum sum per month to 
supplement her social security payment by selling her one-half 
interest to these five children. (Tr. 277; 288). 
The five brothers and sisters agreed that they could each 
afford to pay Elsie $30.00 per month, and Elsie would therefore 
receive the sum of $150.00 per month, or $1,800 per year, to 
supplement to her social security payment. 
Brad Adair, at Southern Utah Title, was asked to research 
the status of the title of the subject property. (Tr. 445) . 
He, of course, knew that the joint tenancy deed had been 
recorded in June of 1979, and confirmed that no other deeds were 
of record. He prepared an affidavit for Elsie to sign to sever 
the joint tenancy, which she did, and the joint tenancy was 
severed by the recordation of the affidavit and death 
certificate. However, the joint tenancy was not severed until 
August 15th, 1980, or ten months after the death of Cloyd 
Brinkerhoff. (Exhibit 21). Prior to the execution of any other 
documents, Brad Adair inquired of his grandmother as to whether 
or not she wanted to deed the other one-half interest to her 
five children. The following is an excerpt from his testimony 
Q. MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Did you prepare the deed from 
your grandmother to the five children for her 
one-half interest? 
A. MR. ADAIR: Yes, I did. 
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Q. And did you discuss that with your grandmother? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And describe that discussion, if you will? 
A. Well it took quite awhile for her to decide that 
this is the way she wanted to go, you know, so 
that she would get the money and the other five 
children would have something also, and so I did 
go ahead and prepare the document and the way I 
remember, I took them to my mother's home, I left 
them there, and I discussed this several times 
with my grandma. 
Q. What did you discuss with grandma on these 
several occasions? 
A. Well I told her what the effect of it would be, 
you know, and also that if the joint tenancy deed 
held and if she died Mark would have all the 
property and that, you know, under that she would 
be conveying her interest to the other five 
children, that in turn would receive $30.00 a 
month each from the other five children. 
Q. Did she appear to understand that transaction? 
A. Yes she did. 
Q. Did she at any time tell you she didn't want to 
deed her one-half interest? 
A. No. (Tr. 446-447) . 
Elsie then executed a deed from herself to Golda, Warren, 
Arlene, Charles and Betty, each as to an undivided one-fifth 
interest for the one-half ownership she still maintained in the 
subject property. (Exhibit 6, attached). Mark Brinkerhoff, of 
course, owned the other one-half interest by reason of the 1979 
joint tenancy deed. 
At the request of these five children and with Elsie's 
understanding, Brad Adair also prepared a separate Trust Deed 
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Note for each to sign. These notes were for $10
 f 000 eachf 
payable at the rate of $30.00 per month and were secured by a 
Trust Deed on the property deeded by Elsie. The Trust Deed was 
signed by all five children evidencing a total obligation to 
Elsie in the sum of $50,000. (Exhibit 7, Trust Deed and Exhibit 
20, Trust Deed Note and Escrow Agreements) . Each of these five 
children also signed an Escrow Agreement designating the 
Orderville Branch of State Bank of Southern Utah as the escrow 
depository to receive the $30.00 per month payment from each 
child. The Trust Deed was thereafter recorded and the escrow 
established. Payments were made by the five children on a 
regular basis, and have been paid by Defendants, Golda Adair, 
Arlene B. Goulding, and Warren Brinkerhoff, each and every month 
since September 1980. (Exhibit 14, ledger sheet from State Bank 
of Southern Utah). 
Since 1981 the taxes have been paid by both Plaintiffs and 
Defendants based on county ownership records and Mark 
specifically knew that he had been paying only one-half of the 
taxes and that his five brothers and sisters claimed ownership 
of one-half of the property. (Tr. 115). 
Prior to Cloyd's death in 1979, the last payment made to 
Elsie on the 1966 contract was a $400.00 payment in December of 
1976. (Finding of Fact 9, R. 632). After Cloyd's death in 
October of 1979, Mark became concerned that the true facts would 
surface and it would become known that he had not been paying 
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his mother as promised, and Lena was apparently asking 
questions. In November of 1979, Mark deposited directly into 
his mother's account, the sum of $706.00. (Exhibit 15). 
On December 8, 1980, Mark tendered to Elsie a check in the 
sum of $2,000, apparently in an attempt to reinstate the 
contract. This payment was refused by Elsie. (Tr. 81) . On 
October 14,, 1981, Mark and Lena again tendered a check in the 
sum of $2,000 to Elsie and that tender was likewise refused by 
Elsie. (Tr. 107, Exhibit 17). These payments were rejected by 
Elsie because she knew she had deeded her one-half interest in 
the property to her five children, that she was receiving money 
from them and that Mark already owned the other one-half 
interest in the property by reason of the joint tenancy deed and 
Cloydfs subsequent death. It only seems logical that Elsie felt 
the partnership operated by Mark and Cloyd was only entitled to 
a one-half interest in the property - they had paid far less 
than one-half of the payments due to her through 1980 
($10,996.75 paid of $28,000 due and owing). 
On June 21st, 1982, an action was filed by Lena, against 
Elsie, Mark, and the five other brothers and sisters. On 
November 1st, 1982, Mark again tendered a check in the sum of 
$2,000, but that payment was likewise refused by Hans Q. 
Chamberlain, who at that time represented Elsie Brinkerhoff. 
After this litigation arose and an Answer and Counterclaim 
had been filed on their behalf, Charles Brinkerhoff and Betty 
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Esplin decided that in the interests of family harmony, they did 
not want to participate in the litigation. At that time they 
deeded their one-fifth interest of the one-half interest they 
received from Elsie, to Mark and Lena (Exhibits 9 and 10) , who 
by that time had entered into an agreement between themselves to 
evidence a unified front. 
Therefore, at the time of trial, the record title indicated 
that Mark owned a six-tenths interest, Lena a one-tenth 
interest, Golda a one-tenth interest, Arlene a one-tenth 
interest, and Warren a one-tenth interest. 
Since Defendants claim that the trial court committed 
reversible error when it determined that Elsie Brinkerhoff has 
been incompetent since 1970, it is important for this court to 
understand how the issue of competency arose at the time of 
trial. As discussed in more detail, below, the issue of Elsie's 
competency was not raised by Plaintiffs in their complaint, 
amended complaint, discovery, or in the pretrial order prepared 
by Plaintiffs' counsel. Likewise, Defendants have always 
maintained that Elsie was competent until she signed a 
Stipulation on September 9th, 19 8 4 when she was not represented 
by counsel. Likewise, in this appeal, Elsie Brinkerhoff is not 
represented by counsel. Even though the trial court appointed 
Kirk Heaton, Attorney at Law, Kanab, Utah, as the guardian of 
Elsie Brinkerhoff, he has apparently elected not to participate 
in this appeal on Elsie's behalf. 
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On the first day of trial, Elsie Brinkerhoff was called by 
Plaintiff, but not until Defendants1 counsel cross-examined her 
did the court sua sponte, raise the issue of her incompetency. 
On August 13, 1983, Elsie requested the undersigned, Hans 
Q. Chamberlain, who initially represented, to withdraw as her 
attorney of record as per a document prepared by Mark's son, 
Dale Brinkerhoff. (Exhibit 11) . Said attorney did withdraw, 
and did not see Elsie again until her deposition was taken on 
February 11th, 1985, ten days prior to trial. Because the 
undersigned noticed a significant change in her mental condition 
at the time of deposition, and because she had signed a 
Stipulation prepared when she was unrepresented by counsel on 
September 9th, 1984, the following dialogue took place at the 
time of trial: 
Q. MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Now before we go to that, 
let me just ask you a couple of these questions; are 
you represented by an attorney in this case? 
A. ELSIE BRINKERHOFF; No. 
Q. You're not? 
A. No. 
Q. Alright. 
A. I never had to have an attorney for anything. 
Q. Were you represented by me on one occasion? 
A. Well until I called you or sent word to you 
that I didn't want to be in on it anymore. 
Q. Alright. So right now you don't think you 
are represented by an attorney? 
A. No. 
15 
Q. Do you know that you are being sued in this 
lawsuit today? 
A, No. I've heard about it, but I don't know 
anything about it. 
Q. You don't know that you're being sued? 
A. No. I asked Lena what I was being sued forf 
and she said I wasn't being sued. 
Q. Did you ever ask Lena why she sued you in the 
first place? 
A. No, I never have. I don't know why. 
Q. Okeh. When you testified at this deposition 
that we took were you represented by an attorney? 
A. You were the only one I have ever had 
anything to do with, 'til we got in with this Mr. 
Bishop there. 
Q. Okey. So does Mr. Bishop represent you now? 
A. I don't know whether he does nor not. I 
never asked him. He never told me anything about it 
so — 
Q. Alright. 
THE COURT; Do you represent her Mr. Bishop? 
MR, BISHOP; I do, your Honor. I received a 
letter on the 16th of October from Mrs. Brinkerhoff 
asking me to do so. It looks like her signature on 
the other documents I've seen. 
THE COURT; She doesn't know that she asked you. 
Q. Did you — 
THE COURT; Go ahead. I will look after her 
interests. How's that. 
Q. Did you ever write to Mr. Bishop and ask him 
to represent you? 
A. No. 
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Q. If you'd give me a minute, okeh? 
A. Sure, go ahead. 
Q. Mrs. Brinkerhoff, would you turn to Page 11. 
I'm sorry, let's go to Page 11. Can I help you there 
just a little? 
A. Well — 
THE COURT; Let me just make a record at this 
point: The record shall indicate that the Court is of 
the opinion that Mrs. Brinkerhoff should have 
representation, but because of the timing of this 
matter, that the Court will look after her interests 
and I'm not going to hold up the trial for the purpose 
of bringing in independent counsel and the Court will 
attempt to look out after her interests, but it's the 
Court's opinion that she does not fully understand the 
consequences of the matter before the Court, and she 
has not and the Court finds she is not fully 
understood at this point and for a considerable period 
of time, but the Court will allow the proceedings to 
go forward and the Court will try to look out for her 
interests, but at the same time, reserves the right to 
stop the proceedings if I feel that her interests are 
not (sic) being abused. 
I'm making that so that there's no question on 
the record why I am doing what I am doing, but I think 
that in the interest of judicial economy, I should go 
forward with the proceedings. You* may proceed 
counsel. (Tr. 345-348). 
Because the trial court ruled early in the trial that Elsie 
had been incompetent "for a considerable period of time," and 
without any evidence presented by Plaintiffs concerning 
competency (apparently relying only upon the testimony of Elsie 
Brinkerhoff at time of trial) , Defendants were put in the 
position of having to rebut the finding by the trial court that 
Elsie was incompetent when she executed the joint tenancy deed 
in 1979, and the deed from herself to her five children in 1980. 
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After that finding by the trial court, each witness, including 
both Plaintiffs' and Defendants1, was asked if they thought 
Elsie was competent in 1979 and in 1980, and each witness 
answered without hesitation that she was in fact competent. 
(See discussion under Point I, below). The trial court's ruling 
that Elsie became incompetent in 1970 was clearly contrary to 
all evidence presented. 
HOW THE PARTIES WERE INITIALLY REPRESENTED, THE CHANGES 
THAT OCCURRED DURING DISCOVERY AND THE TRIAL ITSELF, 
AND THE INCONSISTENCY IN PLAINTIFFS' POSITION 
When this action was filed on June 22, 1982, Lena, acting 
through the personal representative of the estate of Cloyd 
Brinkerhoff, sued Elsie, Mark, Golda, Warren, Arlene, Charles 
and Betty, seeking to specifically enforce the 1966 contract and 
cancel all other deeds executed by Elsie. (R. 1-8, 351-170). 
Defendants1 attorney herein, Hans Q. Chamberlain, was initially 
contacted personally by Elsie, Golda, Warren, Arlene, Charles 
and Betty. An extensive Answer and Counterclaim was prepared on 
behalf of those parties, including Elsie Brinkerhoff, alleging, 
in part, (1) forfeiture under the 1966 contract, (2) a request 
for an accounting from her two sons who signed the purchase 
agreement, and (3) damages for conversion of personal property. 
(R. 16-27) . Interrogatories were thereafter submitted by 
Defendants to Plaintiffs. On August 13th, 1983, Elsie requested 
that she did not want to remain a party to the action and 
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requested that her attorney, Hans Q. Chamberlain, withdraw, 
which he did. (Exhibit 11) . However, Elsie was advised in 
writing that she was still a party litigant to this lawsuit and 
that she should have other counsel. (Exhibit 6, attached). 
Elsie Brinkerhoff thereafter remained unrepresented until 
Willard R. Bishop, the attorney who had sued her in the first 
instance, entered an appearance on her behalf and did so on 
February 14th, 1985 one week prior to trial. (R. 421-426) . 
However, prior to that time, on September 7th, 1984, Willard R. 
Bishop, as attorney for Mont R. Anderson, Lena and Mark prepared 
a Stipulation (Exhibit 40, attached), which Elsie signed. That 
Stipulation (1) reaffirms the 1966 contract, (2) repudiates 
other deeds signed by Elsie, (3) waives all delinquent amounts 
owed to her and (4) dismissed the Counterclaim filed by Hans Q. 
Chamberlain on behalf of Elsie against Mark J. Brinkerhoff and 
Cloyd's estate. After the Stipulation was signed by Elsie, a 
copy was submitted by Plaintiffs to the court together with a 
proposed judgment running in favor of Plaintiffs. A telephone 
conference call was held between the court and counsel wherein 
the subject of the Stipulation was discussed, at which time the 
court refused to sign the proposed judgment. 
Therefore, at the beginning of the trial, Willard R. Bishop 
represented Lena, Elsie and Mark, even though he had originally 
sued Elsie and Mark on behalf of Lena. However, because of the 
court's ruling, during a part of the first day of trial and 
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during the entire second day of trial, Elsie was not represented 
by counsel, (Finding of Fact No. 31, R. 647), and no one has 
entered an appearance.on her behalf at this time. 
It is evident that the trial court determined that the easy 
way to resolve this dispute was to simply rule that Elsie 
Brinkerhoff became legally incompetent in 1970 and allow all 
past due payments to be paid, post-trial. The court, however, 
failed to recognize the legal significance of that ruling as it 
relates to Elsie's interests (see discussion, below). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE; 
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT ARBITRARILY 
FOUND THAT ELSIE BRINKERHOFF HAS BEEN LEGALLY INCOMPETENT 
SINCE 1770. 
The trial court determined the only way to find in favor of 
Plaintiffs was to declare the seller, Elsie Brinkerhoff, legally 
incompetent from and after 1970. The effect of that ruling was 
to void all documents she executed after 1970 including her last 
will and testament, deeds, affidavits and a Trust Deed running 
in her favor for $50,000. However, all testimony presented was 
clear and convincing that she was competent on each occasion 
when she executed those documents in 1979, 1980 and 1982. 
POINT TWO; 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FAILING TO 
APPOINT A GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOLLOWING ITS DETERMINATION 
THAT ELSIE BRINKERHOFF WAS INCOMPETENT. 
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The trial court found that Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff 
became legally incompetent in 1970 and did so on the first day 
of trial even though her competency was never at issue. The 
court simultaneously found that she was not being properly 
represented by her counsel, Willard R. Bishop, but failed to 
recess trial and appoint a general guardian or guardian ad litem 
to protect her interests. That ruling was clearly contrary to 
all evidence presented and the court thereafter failed to 
protect the interests of Elsie Brinkerhoff. 
POINT THREE: 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT ELSIE BRINKERHOFF WAS 
INCOMPETENT IN 1970 DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT SHE WAS 
NOT SUFFICIENTLY COMPETENT TO EXECUTE BINDING DEEDS AND 
CONTRACTS IN 1979 and 1980. 
Even assuming arguendo that the trial court was correct in 
ruling that Elsie Brinkerhoff was incompetent in 1970 and that 
it could properly represent her best interests during the course 
of the trial, there is ample evidence to indicate that Elsie 
Brinkerhoff was competent when she executed documents in 1979, 
1980 and 1982, as well as on other occasions. 
POINT FOUR; 
THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT THE 1966 CONTRACT TERMINATED 
BY OPERATION OF LAW. 
The evidence clearly indicates the intent to abandon the 
contract by the parties because no payments were made for 1966, 
1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, and 1971; the escrow required by the 
contract was never fully established and all the deeds called 
for in the contract'were never deposited. 
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POINT FIVE: 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE PERFECT TENDER RULE 
IN SPECIFICALLY ENFORCING THE 1966 CONTRACT. 
By declaring Elsie incompetent, the court allowed the 1966 
Purchase Agreement to be reinstated on the Plaintiffs1 payment 
of $50,000, post-trial. The Plaintiffs had in fact acknowledged 
arrearages in payments of $30,000 at the time of trial. Since 
Plaintiffs as buyers, failed to tender that amount prior to or 
at the time of trial, the trial court erred in granting a Decree 
of Specific Performance in favor of Plaintiffs by reason of "The 
Perfect Tender Rule". 
POINT SIX: 
MARK AND CLOYD OPERATED AS A PARTNERSHIP AND THE ACT OF ONE 
PARTNER BINDS THAT PARTNERSHIP. 
When Cloyd had the joint tenancy deed prepared in 1979 and 
paid to have it recorded with partnership funds, he did so on 
behalf of the partnership. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT 
ARBITRARILY FOUND THAT ELSIE BRINKERHOFF HAS BEEN 
LEGALLY INCOMPETENT SINCE 1970. 
Without any supporting evidence, the court arbitrarily 
ruled that Elsie Brinkerhoff has been legally incompetent since 
1970. (Finding of Fact 15, R. 640). There is not one shred of 
evidence in the record to support a finding of incompetency even 
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as early as 1979. All witnesses who were asked about Elsie's 
competency testified that she was competent in both 1979 and 
1980 when she executed the joint tenancy deed and in 1980, when 
she executed the deed conveying her one-half interest. 
Such a ruling with all available evidence being contrary is 
repugnant to the law and the presumptions created thereby. 
In 28 Am.Jur., Insane and Other Incompetent Persons § 121, 
(1962), p.751, it states: 
"It is well settled that the law will presume sanity 
rather than insanity, competency rather than 
incompetency; it will presume that every man is sane 
and fully competent until satisfactory proof to the 
contrary is presented." 
* * * 
This statement of the law was cited with approval by the Oregon 
Supreme Court in First Christian Church in Salem v. McReynolds, 
241 P.2d 135, 138 (Or. 1952) . The Oregon Court went on to add: 
In accord with the general presumption of sanity, 
there is a presumption that every man is capable of 
managing his own affairs, and is responsible for his 
own acts. Likewise, it is presumed that every man is 
capable of understanding the nature and effect of his 
contracts, and that he comprehends the effect and 
result of legal proceedings. Accordingly, it may be 
stated that as a general rule, all proceedings testing 
the competency of a person, or involving the 
competency of an individual to perform a certain act, 
as to execute a valid conveyance of property or a 
contract, start with the presumption of competency, 
and that this presumption may be relied upon until the 
contrary is shown." 
* * * 
First Christian Church in Salem v. McReynolds, 241 P.2d at 138. 
See also Roybal v. Morris, 669 P.2d 1100 (N.M. 1983). 
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The foregoing presumption is guarded by a heightened 
standard or burden of proof which requires the presentation of 
"clear and convincing evidence" to rebutt it* The presumption 
and the burden of proof are concisely stated in Binder v. 
Binder, 309 P.2d 1050 (Wash. 1957): 
"Mental competency is presumed; and in order to 
establish mental incompetency, fraud, or undue 
influence, the evidence must be clear, cogent, and 
convincing." 
Binder v. Binder, 309 P.2d at 1053. 
Recognizing that a finding of incompetence requires a 
balancing of the State's interest in protecting the person from 
himself and the effect such a finding may have on a person's 
individual liberties, the Utah Supreme Court embraced the "clear 
and convincing" evidence test in In re Boyer, 636 P. 2d 1092 
(Utah 1981). In that case the court reasoned as follows: 
"In the absence of a legislative directive on the 
issue, we think those interests are best accommodated 
by requiring evidence of incompetency by .clear and 
convincing evidence." 
* * * 
In re Boyer, 636 P.2d at 1092. See also Rawson v. Hardy, 48 
P.2d 473 (Utah 1935) . 
The court made a finding of incompetence even though 
Plaintiffs never alleged that Elsie Brinkerhoff was ever 
incompetent. (See Plaintiffs' Complaint, R. 1-8; Amended 
Complaint R. 351-370; Pretrial Order prepared by Plaintiffs' 
counsel, R. 428-445; Trial Brief of Defendants, R. 472-523). 
Believing that the competency of Elsie had never been 
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challenged, in their Trial Brief, filed the first day of trial, 
Defendants state as follows: 
Of significance is the fact that Plaintiffs have not 
plead fraud, undue influence, incompetency, or mistake 
on the part of Elsie Brinkerhoff in connection with 
the preparation of the 1979 joint tenancy deed or the 
preparation of the 1980 transaction where Elsie deeded 
to her five children. 
Instead of making those claims, Plaintiffs have 
elected to have Elsie sign a Stipulation whereby she 
supposedly reaffirms the 1966 contract, disclaims the 
1979 joint tenancy deed, disclaims the 1980 deeds from 
herself to her five children, and waives any 
delinquent amounts owed to her by Mark or the estate 
of Cloyd Brinkerhoff. (R. 488) . 
The court simply searched for a way to find in favor of 
Plaintiffs and did so by ignoring the presumption in favor of 
competency, the fact that competency was not properly at issue, 
and the fact that there was no evidence rebutting the 
presumption which prevented any possibility of meeting the 
required burden of proof. Such a finding is clearly an abuse of 
the trial court's discretion and fails in every way to protect 
the interests of Elsie Brinkerhoff as the court tried to do in 
its justification for so ruling. (See discussion infra). 
A summary of the testimony and even the statement of 
Elsie's counsel clearly indicates the error made by the trial 
court in ruling that Elsie Brinkerhoff has been incompetent 
since 1970. 
STATEMENT OF WILLARD R. BISHOP, COUNSEL FOR ELSIE BRINKERHOFF. 
In Plaintiffs' opening statement, Mr. Bishop stated as 
follows: 
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MR. BISHOP: The evidence will show, and I didn't 
cover this but, the evidence will show that she (meaning 
Elsie Brinkerhoff) is very alert, and maintains her own 
home, and maintains her own checking account, pays her 
bills, drives herself around and does all things that we 
normally expect people to do in maintaining their daily 
lives. (Tr. 26). 
TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF MARK BRINKERHOFF. 
Plaintiff Mark Brinkerhoff testified that in 1980 he 
had a conversation with his mother, Elsie, concerning the 
fact that she had refused to accept a check tendered by him 
in the sum of $2,000. That at that time, he believed his 
mother to be competent and that she was likewise competent 
in 1979. (Tr. 79-81). 
TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT GOLDA B. ADAIR. 
Golda B. Adair is the daughter of Elsie Brinkerhoff. 
She testified that in 1979, she saw her mother once or 
twice a week and would call her about every day. That she 
believed her to be competent in 1979 and 1980, that she was 
able to handle her own affairs, that she wrote checks at 
that time, that she paid her own bills, that she cleaned 
her own home and that there was no change in her condition 
from 1979 to 1980. (Tr. 477-478). 
TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT ELSIE BRINKERHOFF. 
At the time of trial Elsie Brinkerhoff was 86 years 
old. She testified that she lives alone, that she reads at 
home on a daily basis, that she gets around by herself, 
that she still drives an automobile, has a drivers license, 
does some of her own shopping, that she has a checking 
account and manages it herself, that she has a savings 
account, but that it is handled by her daughter Betty, that 
she participates in senior citizens1 outings, that she does 
her own sewing, washing, ironing, and cooking. (Tr. 
318-321) . 
Elsie Brinkerhoff also testified that in her opinion, 
she is now competent to handle her own affairs. (Tr. 326). 
TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT CHARLES BRINKERHOFF. 
Charles Brinkerhoff is the son of Elsie Brinkerhoff 
and was an original Defendant when the action was filed. 
He testified that his mother was competent in 1979 and 
1980, and when asked if he thought she was competent at the 
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time of trial, answered flYesf to a certain extent, I do." 
He also testified that he thought his mother was as 
competent today as he was and that he can't remember any 
more than she can, (Tr. 394-395) . 
TESTIMONY OF DALE BRINKERHOFF. 
Dale Brinkerhoff is the son of Plaintiff, Mark 
Brinkerhoff, and the grandson of Elsie Brinkerhoff. Dale 
Brinkerhoff's belief that his grandmother was competent is 
evidenced by both his testimony and the fact that he had 
his grandmother sign a document he prepared on August 13th, 
1983 (Exhibit 11) and the Stipulation whereby Elsie 
reaffirmed the 1966 contract (Exhibit 40, attached). 
Mr. Brinkerhoff testified that he visited regularly 
with his grandmother, and that she was competent in 1979, 
1980, and that she was competent at the time of trial. 
(Tr. 420). 
TESTIMONY OF BRAD ADAIR. 
Brad Adair is the son of Golda Adair and the grandson 
of Elsie Brinkerhoff. He is employed by Southern Utah 
Title Company in Kanab, Utah. He testified that after he 
prepared the joint tenancy deed (as well as a deed from 
Elsie to Charles for property unrelated to this 
transaction), he delivered them to Charles who obtained the 
signature of Elsie and returned them to him for 
recordation, that he had a conversation with Elsie wherein 
she indicated that she signed the deeds, that the deeds 
were delivered back to him by Charles for recordation and 
the deeds were both recorded, one right after the other. 
(Tr. 438-443). He also testified that the cost for 
recording the joint tenancy deed was the sum of $18.00 and 
that it was paid by his employer, Southern Utah Title. 
(Tr. 444) . Southern Utah Title was reimbursed the 
recording costs for the joint tenancy deed by a check from 
the partnership on December 31, 1979. (See Exhibit 19, 
Entry Book, Kane County Recorder showing recordation costs 
for joint tenancy deed in the sum of $18.50 and compared to 
the last page of Exhibit 39, check records for Mark J. and 
Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff Partnership, indicating that a check 
was made payable to Brad Adair on December 31st, 1979 for 
the sum of $18.00) . 
As to the competency of Elsie Brinkerhoff, Brad Adair 
testified that he thought his grandmother, Elsie, was 
competent in 1979 and 1980, that he explained to her the 
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fact that she would be deeding her one-half interest when 
she executed the deed to her five children and that she 
would receive back a Trust Deed for $50,000. (Tr. 
447-448). 
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM WEBSTER ADAIR, 
Webster Adair is the husband of Golda Adair, and the 
Kane County Recorder. He testified that Elsie came to his 
home about every Sunday for dinner until this litigation 
started and Dale Brinkerhoff had told her not to have 
anything to do with his family any more, that he had a 
conversation with Elsie two or three weeks after Cloyd's 
death and when he inquired as to whether or not she wanted 
Mark to have all of the property, she said no. He also 
testified that he was present when the Trust Deed, Trust 
Deed Notes and Warranty Deed from Elsie to her five 
children were discussed and explained to her, that she 
raised no objection to the same, and that she was competent 
in June of 1979 and in 1980. (Tr. 466-472). 
TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF LENA A. BRINKERHOFF. 
Lena Brinkerhoff is the widow of Cloyd Brinkerhoff, 
the sister of Webster Adair, and a Plaintiff herein. She 
testified that during the summer of 1979, she saw Elsie 
Brinkerhoff a couple of times a week, that in June of 1979, 
she thought Elsie Brinkerhoff to be competent, that she 
thought that when her husband took anything to Elsie for 
signature, that he explained to her the things she would 
need to know when she had to sign something, including a 
deed. That she also thought Elsie Brinkerhoff to be 
competent in 1980, that if documents were taken to her, 
they were explained to her and that in her opinion, her 
husband, Cloyd, believed that Elsie understood what she was 
signing. (Tr. 480-483) . 
A careful review of the transcript indicates that 
Plaintiff's counsel never once asked any witness whether or not 
he or she believed Elsie Brinkerhoff to be competent or 
incompetent. The reason is obvious: How can you allege and 
prove the incompetency of your own client (Elsie) when a few 
months prior to that time, you prepared a Stipulation for her to 
sign (without counsel) that did away with the claims 
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of the Defendants, waived any past due payments owed to by her 
Co-Plaintiffs, and requested the court to enter a Decree of 
Specific Performance against her. (Exhibit 40, attached). 
As indicated above, on the first day of trial, the court 
determined that the interests of Elsie Brinkerhoff were not 
being fully protected, and that even though she needed separate 
counsel to represent her interests, the court would not hold up 
the trial for the purpose of bringing in independent counsel, 
but instead would look out for her interests. (Tr. 347, Finding 
of Fact No. 31, R. 647). However, the court actually failed to 
look out for the interests of Elsie Brinkerhoff, where, with all 
evidence to the contrary, it found Elsie to have been 
incompetent since 1970. Using that same reasoning, the court 
could have just as easily determined that Elsie was incompetent 
in 1966 when the purchase contract (Exhibit 1) was signed, 
thereby voiding the entire transaction. The effect of that 
would have been to return all of the property to Elsie, said 
property having a value at the date of trial of approximately 
$410,000. (Exhibit 37). The evidence, or lack thereof, as to 
Elsie's incompetencey is just as strong for 1966 as it was in 
1970. If the court was trying to find some evidence of 
incompetency to support its finding, the fact that no payments 
were made to Elsie by her sons for 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970 
and 1971, could just as easily have evidenced her incompetency 
for the reason that she apparently made no claim against them by 
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reason of nonpayment. Using what appears to be the trial 
court fs logic, the failure to request payment on the part of 
Elsie would manifest her incompetence as early as 1966, if any 
finding at all of her incompetency is justified. 
Further indication of the trial court's failure to protect 
Elsie Brinkerhoff is the fact that the court declared the Last 
Will and Testament of Elsie Brinkerhoff dated April 23, 1982, 
(Exhibit 13, attached) to be null and void, even though said 
will was prepared by the law offices of Olsen and Chamberlain, 
Richfield, Utah, attested to by two independent witnesses who 
each verified that in their opinions, Elsie Brinkerhoff was of 
sound and disposing mind and memory and not acting under any 
menace, fraud or undue influence. Furthermore, that will is 
notarized as required by Utah law, and pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated 75-2-504, constitutes a self-proved will. 
The issue of competency was not plead and was not before 
the court prior to the time of trial. However, because 
Defendants needed to rebut the finding by the court on the first 
day of trial, the foregoing testimony substantiating the 
competency of Elsie Brinkerhoff was taken and remains unrebutted 
in the record. There is no "clear and convincing evidence" of 
any peculiar act or event occurring in 1970, or otherwise, upon 
which the trial court could have based its finding that Elsie 
became incompetent at that time. 
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In Cornia v. Corniaf 546 P.2d 890 (Utah 1976), the court 
dealt with a factual situation somewhat "reciprocal" to the 
foregoing and held that the trial court had abused its 
discretion in going beyond the issues before it. 
In Cornia, the court was involved in a proceeding to have a 
guardian appointed for an 81-year-old woman. The issue of 
competency was paramount and properly before the court. The 
trial court ruled that the woman was sufficiently incompetent to 
warrant the appointment of a guardian. There were additional 
indications that during a period prior to the adjudicated 
incompetency, the woman had executed a will and a trust deed 
conveying away a certain portion of her property. The trial 
court therefore included in its ruling an order declaring the 
will and the trust deed to be null and void. The Supreme Court 
affirmed the competency ruling but held that "the trial court 
erred in declaring null and void the will and trust deed [that 
the woman] had executed. Cornia, 546 P.2d at 893. The Supreme 
Court observed that the only issue before the trial court was 
the issue of competency at the time of trial and not two years 
prior thereto. The Supreme Court went on to state: 
While it is true that our rules provide for liberality 
in procedure and the granting of relief to which the 
evidence shows a party entitled, this does not go so 
far as to authorize the granting of relief on issues 
neither raised nor tried. 
Cornia v. Cornia, 546 P.2d at 893. 
In the present case, the trial court was presented with the 
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parties1 dispute over enforcement of a 1966 Real Estate Contract 
or a subsequently joint tenancy deed recorded on the same real 
property, with collateral issues of waiver, abandonment, 
rescission, forfeiture, payment, etc. Where neither Plaintiff 
nor Defendant had raised the issue of incompetency, the grantor 
was entitled to the benefit of her presumed competency. 
However, without an actionable issue before it, without allowing 
for the grantor to be represented by competent counsel, and in 
the face of unrebutted evidence to the contrary, the trial court 
attempted to resolve the law suit by declaring the grantor 
incompetent from some prior and arbitrary point in time, and 
relying on that declaration, nullifying and voiding all of the 
incompetent's subsequent contracts and conveyances. 
The Cornia court used a proper determination of competency 
to void a prior executed deed and was reversed as to the 
avoidance; the trial court in the present case used an improper 
determination of incompetency to "boot-strap" its way into a 
later avoidance of both a joint tenancy deed, a subsequent 
severance of the tenancy and an even later conveyance of a 
one-half interest in the same property. Such "boot-strapping" 
at the expense of an individual's competency when neither the 
pleadings nor the evidence so indicates is an unquestionable 
abuse of discretion and, at a minimum, constitutes reversible 
error. 
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POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY .FAILING 
TO APPOINT A GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOLLOWING ITS 
DETERMINATION THAT ELSIE BRINKERHOFF WAS INCOMPETENT. 
Rule 17(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in 
pertinent part: 
When an infant or an insane or incompetent person is a 
party, he must appear either by his general guardian, 
or by a guardian ad litem appointed in the particular 
case by the court in which the action is pending. 
(Emphasis added.) 
* * * 
Nowhere in the rule is there a provision for the trial 
court to "look after someone's interest", particularly during a 
trial. The rule specifically states that an incompetent person 
can only appear by his guardian and that absent a general 
guardian, the court must appoint for the incompetent person a 
guardian ad litem. By acting as it did, the trial court has 
obviously exceeded its statutory authority. 
By analogy, in Matter of Estate of Anderson, 671 P. 2d 165 
(Utah 1983) , the Utah Supreme Court held that the trial court 
had exceeded its statutory power and the rational for reversal 
is somewhat applicable to the situation present in this case. 
The court stated: 
In the case under review the [court's] order attempted 
to void testamentary dispositions made by a protected 
person who had not been declared incompetent. The 
applicable statutes did not give the court the power 
to make that order. 
* * * 
Matter of Estate of Anderson, 671 P.2d at 169. 
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In the instant case the court also failed to address in its 
decision or its Findings of Fact, Elsie's Counterclaim that the 
1966 contract had been rescinded, abandoned, terminated by 
operation of law or terminated by reason of nonpayment, thus 
restoring the entire property to her. Likewise, the court 
failed to address any of the other claims of Elsie set forth in 
the pretrial order. (R. 428-444). Instead the court found she 
had been incompetent for 15 years, contrary to all evidence 
presented. 
In the case at bar, the trial court exceeded its statutory 
power by failing and refusing to appoint a guardian ad litem. 
It is inconceivable that in the same breath the court could 
declare a person incompetent and assert that it would thereafter 
be "looking out for the incompetent's best interests." In 
presuming to represent the interest of the incompetent person 
the court predjudiced itself, contravened the express provisions 
of the rule, worked an injustice to the alleged incompetent, and 
committed reversible error. 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT ELSIE BRINKERHOFF 
WAS INCOMPETENT IN 1970 DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT 
SHE WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY COMPETENT TO EXECUTE BINDING 
DEEDS AND CONTRACTS IN 1979 AND 1980. 
Even assuming arguendo that the trial court was correct in 
ruling that Elsie Brinkerhoff was incompetent in 1970 and that 
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it could properly represent her best interests during the course 
of trial, the trial court's ruling of incompetency in 1970 does 
not necessarily preclude the possibility of Elsie experiencing 
periods of lucidity in which she possessed the requisite mental 
capacity to enter into a binding contract or execute a valid 
deed. While it is recognized that such a ruling of incompetency 
carries with it some presumption of constancy, it must be 
remembered that the ruling was made in 1985, several years after 
the most recent conveyances. Therefore, the subject conveyances 
having occurred prior to the adjudication of incompetency are 
entitled to a presumption that the grantor was competent and 
that the conveyances are valid. 
In Tate v. Murphy, 217 P.2d 177 (Okla. 1949), the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court wrestled with a factual situation as complicated 
and convoluted as that in the present case. The court in Tate 
dealt with an aging widow who sought to provide for a foster 
child who had provided care and companionship in her final 
years. The testimony on the elderly woman's mental capacity was 
plentiful; however, contrary to the present case, there were a 
few witnesses who expressed concern over her apparent lack of 
capacity. Such concern was generally couched in terms derived 
from her aged and feeble condition. In addressing the issues, 
testimony, and evidence before it, the court in Tate stated: 
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[T]o render a contract voidable on account of the 
mental incapacity of one of the parties to itf it is 
not enough that such party was at times, from whatever 
cause, lacking in sufficient sanity to understand what 
he was doing, but the evidence of his defective 
intelligence must relate to the immediate time of 
making the contract. A deed, mortgage, or other 
conveyance or contract made by an insane person, but 
during a lucid interval before his incapacity has been 
judicially determined, is valid and enforceable, 
(Emphasis added•) 
* * * 
Tate v.Murphy, 217 P.2d at 185, citing Mullen v. First Guaranty 
State Bank of Crossplains, Texas, 113 Okl. 84, 239 P. 161, 162 
(1925) . 
The court in Uribe v. Olson, 42 Or.App. 647, 601 P.2d 818 
(1979) , held similarly: 
Even where there are substantial indications of mental 
incompetence, it is possible that a person may have 
"lucid intervals" during which he possesses the 
requisite capacity. Capacity includes the ability to 
reason and exercise judgment and, in essence, to 
bargain with the other party. Neither old age, 
illness, or extreme emotional distress is sufficient of 
itself to negate such capacity. (Parenthesis in 
original; Citations omitted.) 
Uribe v. Olson, 601 P.2d at 820; See also Hatch v. Hatch, 148 P. 
433 (Utah 1914) . 
In the case at bar, Brad Adair testified that Elsie 
Brinkerhoff gave serious consideration to the deeds which she 
executed in both 1979 and 1980. Furthermore, he gave specific 
testimony that Elsie was competent at the time the deeds were 
executed and notarized. Likewise, every witness who was asked 
concerning Elsie's competency testified that she was competent 
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in both 1979 and 1980. With no testimony to the contrary, and 
with the benefit of the presumption in favor of competency as 
set forth in Point One, above, there is absolutely no reason why 
the joint tenancy deed of 1979 and the conveyance of Elsie's 
one-half interest by Trust Deed in 1980, should have been 
declared null and void by the trial court. 
None of the Defendants had anything to do with the actual 
preparation, execution and recordation of the joint tenancy deed 
prepared in June of 1979. That deed was prepared, executed and 
recorded at the request of Cloyd Brinkerhoff. The cost to 
record the joint tenancy deed was paid by the partnership. The 
record provides no evidence of undue influence on the part of 
Plaintiffs or Defendants when that deed was executed by Elsie, 
and the only testimony before the trial court was that Elsie 
Brinkerhoff was competent in 1979 and 1980. 
Utah law is very clear that absent fraud, duress, mistake 
or the like attributable to the grantee (i.e., Mark, Cloyd or 
Elsie) a competent grantor will not be permitted to act or 
impeach his own deed. Desert Centers, Inc. v. Glen Canyon, 
Inc. , 356 P. 2d 286 (Utah 1960) . Furthermore, a grantor of a 
deed is presumed to be legally competent to make a conveyance 
and, there is no presumption of incompetency where the grantor's 
mind is weakened by "trouble and old age", or where the grantor 
was once proved insane. First Christian Church in Salem v. 
McReynolds, supra; Grover v. Garn, 464 P.2d 598 (Utah 1970), 
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Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 218, 178 P. 433 (1914). See also Watson 
v. Johnson, 411 P.2d 498 (Okla. 1967), which indicate that 
contracts and deeds are not invalid merely because one party may 
be infeebled by old age and/or disease in such a way that some 
of his mental processes are affected if at the time the deed is 
executed and delivered the party understands the nature and 
effect of the execution of the instruments. 
POINT FOUR 
THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT THE 1966 
CONTRACT TERMINATED BY OPERATION OF LAW 
The evidence strongly suggests that Elsie as the seller and 
Mark and Cloyd as the buyers simply abandoned their interests in 
the 1966 contract. In Forsyth v. Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358 (Utah 
1980), the court adopted the language from Timpanogos Highlands, 
Inc. v. Harper, 544 P.2d 481, 484 (Utah 1975), which stated: 
The term "abandonment" in the sense involved here means 
the intentional relinquishment of one's rights in the 
contract; and in order to nullify such rights, there 
must be a clear and unequivocal showing of such 
abandonment. Where there is dispute as to whether this 
had occurred, it is usually a question of fact, to be 
determined from the circumstances of the particular 
case, which includes not only nonperformance, but also 
expressions of intent and other actions. 
Regarding the specific intention to abandon, the following 
is stated in 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Abandoned, Lost, etc., Property, 
§40 (1962), p. 32: 
Intention to abandon property may be shown by the 
declarations or conduct of the party who, it is 
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claimed, abandoned the right. But it is not necessary 
to prove intention to abandon by express declarations 
or by other direct evidence; intent to abandon property 
or rights of property is to be determined, . . . from 
all the surrounding facts and circumstances . . . by 
which that fact may be established. 
* * * 
Consistent with the foregoing, the court in Forsyth 
recognized that while the intent to abandon must be clear and 
unequivocal, that intention need not be shown by the positive 
testimony of the purchaser but may be inferred from his acts and 
conduct, i.e., non payment. Forsyth, 617 P. 2d at 361. The 
court in Forsyth further pointed out that a such an intent to 
abandon by both parties to an agreement may be found to work a 
rescission of the contract. 617 P.2d at 361. 
Such a mutual rescission was found by the court in Wallace 
v. Build, 16 Utah 2d 401, 402 P.2d 699 (1965). There the court 
observed that the facts presented a "situation where the 
defendant had shown by unequivocal acts that he regarded the 
agreement as abandoned, and that the plaintiff had acquiesced in 
this . . . ." 402 P.2d at 701. 
The facts in the present case evince an aging seller, 
mother of the buyers, who for apparent want of family harmony 
and sound legal advice regarding her contract rights and 
responsibilities, failed to give effective demand for payment 
and notice of default; and sellers who possessed and used the 
subject property to their apparent financial benefit, but who 
routinely failed to make their agreed payments and for whatever 
39 
reason continued to take advantage of the familial situation and 
their mother's apparent reluctance to act against them. Indeed, 
the parties began the contractual relationship on a note of 
abandonment by agreeing to execute deeds and set up an escrow, 
neither of which was ever fully accomplished. Perhaps most 
illustrative of the mutual abandonment or rescission of the 1966 
contract is the joint tenancy deed of 1979 wherein Elsie, as 
sole grantor conveyed fee title to the subject property to 
herself, Mark and Cloyd, as joint tenants. It is particularly 
notable that this conveyance was done at the instance and with 
the acquiesence of Mark and Cloyd. 
Technically, this was something of a two-step transaction. 
Presumably, Elsie had only "legal" title to the subject property 
as a result of the 1966 contract; also, Mark and Cloyd 
presumably had acquired some quantum of "equitable" title by 
virtue of the same transaction. Therefore, Elsie could not have 
conveyed fee title via the 1979 joint tenancy deed without Mark 
and Cloyd having first waived and surrendered their "equitable" 
title back to her. There was obviously no documentation to 
support such a "fictional reconveyance;" however, as stated, the 
very creation of the joint tenancy deed requires such a 
hypothetical result; and the acquiesence of Mark and Cloyd in 
its documentation and recording seems to be conclusive with 
respect to the parties1 mutual understanding and intent. 
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Not to be overlooked in this transaction is Elsie's obvious 
reliance on the contractual provisions which required payment in 
full prior to actual conveyance to the buyers. There is little 
doubt but what Elsie believed that the buyers' failure to pay 
meant that she retained complete ownership of the property. 
Equally as persuasive is the apparent mutual assumption of Mark 
and Cloyd that with the joint tenancy in place, their mother 
would predecease them and they would then end up with the 
property "free and clear," having paid next to nothing for it. 
The historical lack of enforcement and lack of performance 
in this case, together with the uncontested "reconveyance" and 
subsequent joint tenancy deed, creates an overwhelming 
presumption of mutual abandonment or mutual rescision of the 
1966 contract. However, because the court elected to 
arbitrarily find Elsie to be incompetent since 1970, the court 
failed to even address those issues on behalf of the incompetent 
that the court undertook to represent. The trial court has 
created a "Catch 22" situation. If Elsie was incompetent in 
1970, she had no capacity to declare a forfeiture or demand 
payment since that time. 
From 1970 to 1982 when this litigation was filed, Mark and 
Cloyd had only paid their mother $6,996.75 and to allow them to 
come in 16 years later and reinstate the contract is a gross 
miscarriage of justice. Assuming Elsie's incompetency in 1970, 
the trial court should have at least addressed the issues of 
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forfeiture, nonpayment, rescission and abandonment on behalf of 
Elsie prior to that time. That evidence clearly indicates 
intent to abandon by the buyers because no payments were made 
for 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970 and 1971; the escrow was never 
established and deeds called for in the contract were never 
deposited. 
If the trial court was really trying to protect Elsie in 
her aging years, the court could have ruled the 1979 joint 
tenancy deed constituted a reformation of the 1966 contract 
based on mutual agreement and ordered Mark, after Cloyd's death, 
to pay his mother one-half of the purchase price originally 
bargained for in 1966. Using that reasoning, the 1980 deed from 
Elsie to her children and the Trust Deed back to Elsie for 
$50,000 would likewise become valid. Hence, Elsie would have 
benefited by several thousand dollars. Furthermore, if Lena had 
any claim at all, it was against Mark as the surviving partner 
and they have now agreed to share equally in whatever property 
Mark receives. (Tr. 125). 
POINT FIVE 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE 
PERFECT TENDER RULE IN SPECIFICALLY 
ENFORCING THE 1966 CONTRACT 
Prior to filing the lawsuit, Plaintiffs, by their own 
admission, were in default of the terms of the 1966 contract and 
delinquent approximately $30,000 in payments. In filing, 
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Plaintiffs sought specific performance of the contract. This 
continuing, uncured default should have precluded the trial 
court from ordering that the contract be specifically enforced, 
which was essentially the precise effect of the courts decision. 
(Judgment and Decree Quieting Title, paragraph 2, R. 655). 
The Utah Supreme articulated and relied on the "Perfect 
Tender Rule" in Century 21 All Western Real Estate and 
Investment, Inc. v. Webb, 645 P.2d 52 (Utah 1982) . The court 
dismissed the purchaser's suit for specific performance for 
their failure to tender their own performance before or at the 
time of bringing suit. In so holding, the court stated: 
[N]either party can be said to be in default (and 
thus susceptible to a judgment for damages or a 
decree of specific performance) until the other 
party has tendered his own performance. In other' 
words, the party who desires to use legal process 
to exercise his legal remedies under such a 
contract must make a tender of his own agreed 
performance in order to put the other party in 
default. 
To qualify under this rule, a tender, such as an 
offer to pay money, must be complete and 
unconditional• (Citations omitted.) 
* * * 
Century 21 All Western Real Estate and Investment, Inc. v. 
Webb, 645 P.2d at 56. 
In Fischer v. Johnson, 525 P.2d 45 (Utah 1974), the 
Supreme Court reversed the trial court's Decree of Specific 
Performance because the purchasers failed to tender the sum of 
$3,000. The court stated: 
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But it is also true that specific performance is a 
remedy of equities; and one who invokes it must have 
clean hands in having done equity himself. That is, 
he must take care to discharge his own duties under 
the contract; and he cannot rely on any mere 
inconvenience as an excuse for so doing. Even if 
inconvenience or difficulty is encountered, he must 
make an effort to perform, or to tender performance, 
which manifests unreasonable diligence and bona fide 
desire to keep his own promises. 
Fischer v. Johnson, 525 P.2d at 46. See also Lincoln Land and 
Development Company v. Thompson, 489 P. 2d 426 (Utah 1971), 
which also reversed the trial court that had entered a Decree 
of Specific Performance wherein the balance of the down payment 
in the sum of $5,800 was not tendered. The court stated: 
Before the plaintiff was entitled to a decree of 
performance it had the burden of showing that it had 
exercised the option in accordance with its terms. 
The plaintiff had the burden of establishing that it 
had paid or tendered the amount specified in the 
option within the prescribed time. It is clear from 
the record that the plaintiff failed to tender the 
sum agreed upon within the time specified in the 
option. It would thus appear that the trial court 
erroneously granted the Decree of Specific 
Performance. 
Lincoln Land and Development Company v. Thompson, 489 P. 2d at 
The trial courtfs acceptance of Plaintiffs' imperfect 
tender and its subsequent ruling providing that the 1966 
contract be specifically performed is in direct conflict with 
the Utah Supreme Court's clear and concise statement of the 
law. Such misapplication of the law should be appropriately 
rectified by this Court on review. 
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POINT SIX 
MARK AND CLOYD OPERATED AS A PARTNERSHIP 
AND THE ACT OF ONE PARTNER BINDS THAT 
PARTNERSHIP. 
There is no dispute that since 1966, Mark and Cloyd 
operated as a partnership* 
When Cloyd had the joint tenancy deed prepared in 1979 and 
paid to have it recorded with partnership funds , he did so on 
behalf of the partnership. Those acts binds not only himself, 
but his partner, Mark Brinkerhoff, as well. See Utah Code 
Annotated §§ 48-1-6 and 48-1-9 (1953), attached. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's arbitrary ruling that Elsie Brinkerhoff 
has been legally incompetent since 1970, has no basis either in 
the evidence presented or in the applicable law. The trial 
court ignored the time honored presumption that a person is 
presumed competent until clear and convincing evidence is 
produced to the contrary. Such a ruling without any legal or 
factual basis whatsoever required the court to reach far beyond 
its discretionary bounds and such an abuse of discretion 
constitutes reversible error. 
Likewise, the trial courts contravention of the statutory 
requirement that an incompetent person be represented by a 
guardian ad litem is also highly inappropriate. Even more 
inappropriate is the court's effort to remain independent and 
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objective while taking upon itself the additional burden of 
"looking out for the alleged incompetent's interests" during 
the trial. Such acts, even though well intentioned, fall well 
outside the bounds of the court's statutory authority and 
judicial calling. Such acts are far from harmless, 
particularly to the alleged incompetent, and such a misuse of 
judicial authority is so erroneous as to demand reversal. 
Simply because the grantor was arguably weakened and 
enfeebled by age, and practically because contracts and 
conveyances had been executed long before any judicial 
attention was drawn to the grantor's mental state, the 
grantor's business dealings, as a matter of law are presumed 
valid. This being the case, the deeds, affidavits, and 
agreements entered into by Elsie Brinkerhoff prior to the time 
of trial, are all valid, effective and binding on her and those 
with whom she dealt in the absence of fraud, coercion, duress, 
or undue influence. All such influences being absent, such 
deeds, conveyances and contracts, and specifically those in 
1979 and 1980 are entitled to a positive presumption, and in 
fact should and do continue in full legal force and effect. 
Even assuming that the 1966 contract may have some 
lingering validity, the Plaintiff's tardy effort to breathe 
life back into it suffered a fatal shortfall. Plaintiff's 
imperfect tender should have precluded the trial court from 
considering specific enforcement as a viable remedy. However, 
46 
consistent with the trial court's misguided handling of the 
other- aspects of this suit, specific performance was in fact 
ordered in direct contradiction of the facts and the applicable 
law. Again, even with the appropriate presumptions in favor of 
the trial court's ruling, there is ample room for this Court to 
intercede on behalf of the facts and the law, which to this 
point have been misaligned. 
This court should reverse the trial court in all respects 
and declare the 1979 joint tenancy deed and the 1980 
conveyances from Elsie to her five children binding and 
enforceable. Likewise, this court should enforce the Trust 
Deed Notes and Trust Deed running in favor of Elsie 
Brinkerhoff. Such a holding would leave Mark and Lena still 
owning seven-tenths of the subject property which is far more 
than they are entitled to receive. However, if this court 
sustains the finding that Elsie was incompetent at an early 
date, that date should be 1964 or 1965 and the 1966 contract of 
sale consequently declared null and void. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3 ' day of October, 138.6. 
H^ Cns Q. Chamberlain 
HAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
Attorneys for 
efendants/Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this day of October, 
1986, ten (10) copies of the within and foregoing APPELLANTS1 
BRIEF were delivered to the Clerk of the Supreme Court, four 
(4) copies of the within and foregoing BRIEF were delivered to 
Willard R. Bishop, BISHOP & RONNOW, P.C., 36- North 300 West, 
Cedar City, Utah, 84720 and one copy to F. Kirk Heaton, 
Attorney at Law, General Guardian for Elsie Brinkerhoff, 70 
North Main, Kanab, Utah 84741. 
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ADDENDUM 
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WILLARD R. BISHOP 
BISHOP & RONNOK, P. C. 
A t t o r n e v for P l a i n t i f f s 
P. 0 . Box 279 
Cedar C i t y , OT 84720 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 536-9483 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COORT OP IAHE COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
MONT R. ANDERSON, p e r s o n a l ) 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e E s t a t e ) 
Of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, ) 
LENA BRINKERHOFF, and MARK J . ) 
BRINKERHOFF, ) PIRST AMENDED FINDIRGS OP 
) PACT AND CONCLUSIONS OP LAW 
P l a i n t i f f s , ) 
vs. ) 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. ) Civil No. 1826 
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ) 
ARLENE B. GOULDING, and JOHN ) 
DOES I through V, ) 
Defendants. ) 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial to the 
Court, sitting without a jury, on Thursday and Friday, February 
21 and 22, 1985. Plaintiffs MONT R. ANDERSON, as personal 
representative of the Estate of CLOYD H. BRINKERBOFF, LENA 
BRINKERHOFF, and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF appeared personally and were 
represented by their counsel of record, Mr. Willard B. Bishop. 
Defendant ELSIE BRINKERBOFF appeared personally and was 
represented by her attorney of record, Mr. Willard R. Bishop. 
Defendants GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERBOFF, and ARLENE B. 
GOOLDING also appeared personally, and were represented by their 
attorney of record, Mr. Hans Q. Chamberlain. CHARLES A. 
BRINKERBOFF and BETTY B. ESPLIN were present. The Court noted 
that originally, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF and BETTY B. ESPLIN had 
been named as Defendants, but had been dismissed from the lawsuit 
by reason of having settled their differences with Plaintiffs. 
Witnesses were sworn and evidence was presented. Argument was 
had. Based upon the evidence, good cause appearing, the Court 
now makes and enters its: 
FIHDIK3S OP PACT 
1. Prior to to August cf 1960, MERLE ERINKERBOPF and ELSIE 
J. BRINKERHOFF were husband and wife, residing in Kane Count*, 
Utah. MERLE DEISKEREQFF v:as e farmer and rancher, and 
accumulated various farming and ranching properties in Kane 
County, Otah, and in Northern Arizen?.. 
2. MERLE and ELSIE BRINKERHOFF were the parents of HARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF, CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, now deceased? WARREN 
BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. GOOLDING, CHARLES BRINKERHOFF, BETTY B. 
ESPLIN, and GOLDA B. ADAIR. Plaintiff LENA BRINKERHOFF is the 
surviving widow of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF. 
3. In or about August of 1960, MERLE BRINKERHOFF died. As a 
result of the normal probate process, the farming and ranching 
property owned by MERLE BRINKERHOFF passed to Defendant ELSIE J. 
BRINKERHOFF. 
4. On or about October 26, 1966, or December 10, 1967, ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF executed a certain agreement covering the sale of 
certain of the farm and ranch real and personal property to MARK 
J. BRINKERHOFF and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF. The contract was the 
result of arm's length bargaining, and was entered into by ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF with the advice of counsel. At the time of entering 
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into the agreement, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF was fully competent, 
legally and in every other sense. 
5. Prior to, concurrent with, and subsequent to the 
execution of the agreement between ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, all the family members were 
and still are aware of the existence of the contract. 
6. Dpon execution of the contract, the purchasers, MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF and CLOYD E. BRINKERHOFF went into and remained in 
possession of the real property covered by the agreement. As of 
the date of trial, MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, and the personal 
representative and heirs of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, still remained 
in possession of the real property, including grazing and water 
rights. If any other children of ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF desired to 
use or graze livestock upon the property, they were permitted to 
do so without objection. 
7. Basically, the agreement provided that in return for 
conveyance of the personal and real property to MARK J. 
BRINKERBOFF and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, the buyers would pay the 
minimum sum of $53,388, payable at the rate of $2,000 per year, 
without interest, during the lifetime of ELSIE BRINKERBOFF. In 
the event that the total minimum price of $53,388 was not paid by 
the time of the death of ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, the contract was 
ambiguous with respect to the disposition and payment of the 
unpaid, amount of the minimum. The contract provided that it and 
documents of conveyance were to be placed in escrow in the 
Hurricane Branch of the Bank of St. George, so that upon full 
performance by the purchasers, MARK J. BRINKERHOFF and LEAH 
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BRINKERHOFF, his wife, would receive legal title to an undivided 
one-half (*?) interest in the property, as joint tenants; and 
CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF and LENA BRINKERHOFF, his wife, would 
receive an undivided one-half (**) interest in the properties, as 
joint tenants. Payments were to be made to the Hurricane Branch 
of the Bank of St. George. 
8. The only documents which were ever actually deposited 
with the escrow agent, consisted of a Warranty Deed from ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF to MARK and LEAH BRINKERHOFF, and a Quit Claim Deed 
from ELSIE BRINKERHOFF to MARK and LEAH BRINKERHOFF. No other 
documents were ever deposited into the bank escrow, and no 
payments were made to the escrow holder. 
9. Payments were made by the purchasers to ELSIE BRINKERHOFF 
outside the escrow, as follows: 
A. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
E. 
F. 
G. 
H. 
I . 
J. 
K. 
L. 
M. 
$2 ,000 . ' 
$2,000.1 
$430.75 
00 p a i d on or be fore November 1 , 
00 p a i d on or be fore November 1 , 
pa id June 1 7 , 1972 . 
$780.00 p a i d November 1 7 , 1972 . 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$780.00 
$500.00 
$600.00 
$500.00 
$400.00 
$706.00 
p a i d Karch 1 9 , 1973 . 
pa id October 2 6 , 1 9 7 3 . 
pa id November 2 8 , 1 9 7 3 . 
pa id Kay 1 3 , 1974 . 
pa id January 2 0 , 1975 . 
pa id December 15 , 1975 . 
pa id in December of 1976 . 
paid November 1 3 , 1979 . 
$1 ,300 .00 paid on November 1 3 , 1 9 7 9 . 
1 9 6 4 . 
1 9 6 5 . 
N. 52,000.00 paid November 6, 1983. 
0. $2,000.00 paid November 4, 1984. 
As of the date of trial, contract payments totalled $14,996.75. 
10. On various occasions and at various times, Plaintiff 
MARK J. BRINKERBOFF and CLOYD B. BRINKERBOFF, now deceased, 
claimed to have made additional payments to ELSIE BRINKERBOFF in 
the nature of support and assistance, as required and requested 
by ELSIE BRINKERBOFF. The Court finds that such additional 
payments and contributions were not intended to be payments under 
the contract by which MARK J. BRINKERBOFF and CLOYD H. 
BRINKERBOFF were purchasers, but were supplied to ELSIE 
BRINKERBOFF in the nature of gifts and support which sons would 
normally provide to their widowed mother. 
11. At no time from and after the inception of the agreement 
between ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF, MARK J. BRINKERBOFF, and CLOYD B. 
BRINKERBOFF and the time of trial, did ELSIE BRINKERBOFF ever 
declare herself dissatisfied with the performance of the 
purchasers under the contract, nor did she declare the contract 
in default or attempt to terminate the contract. That contract 
is still in existence, in full force and effect. 
12. Although the agreement provided for no interest on 
delinquent amounts, the Court finds that ELSIE BRINKERBOFF was 
and is entitled to receive interest at 6% per annum on delinquent 
amounts accruing prior to May 14, 1981, and is entitled to 
receive interest at 10% per annum on delinquent amounts accruing 
after May 14, 1981. 
-5-
13. The Court finds the following to be a true and correct 
accounting of amounts due, payments made, and the balance due 
through January 31, 1986, on the contract between ELSIE 
BRINKERBOFF, MARK J. BRINKERBOFF, and CLOYD B* BRINKERBOFF: 
CONTRACT ACCOOHTIHG 
(6% interest on delinquent amounts 
accruing prior to Hay 14, 1981) 
NOV 1, 1964 Payment due 
Payment made 
NOV 1, 1965 Payment due 
Payment made 
NOV 1, 1966 Payment due 
NOV lr 1967 1 year interest 
at 6% on $2,000 
Payment due 
NOV 1, 1968 1 year interest 
at 6% on $4,000 
Payment due 
NOV 1, 1969 1 year interest 
at 6% on $6,000 
Payment due 
NOV 1, 1970 1 year interest 
at 6% on $8,000 
Payment due 
5 2,000.00 
• 2,000.00 
-0-
2,000.00 
• 2,000.00 
-0-
2,000.00 
120.00 
2,000.00 
4,120.00 
240.00 
2,000.00 
6,360.00 
$120 accrued in 
terest, $4,000 
principal 
$360 accrued in-
360.00 
2,000.00 
8,720.00 
480.00 
2,000.00 
11,200.00 
terest, $6,000 
principal 
$720 accrued in-
terest, $8,000 
principal 
$1,200 accrued in-
terest, $10,000 
principal 
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NOV 1, 1971 1 year interest 
at 6% on 510,000 
Payment due 
JON 17, 1972 229 days interest 
at 6% on $12,000 
600.00 
2,000.00 
13,800.00 
451.72 
$1,800 accrued in-
terest, $12,000 
principal 
Payment made 
NOV 1, 1972 137 days interest 
at 6% on $12,000 
430.75 
Payment due 
NOV 17, 1972 16 days interest 
at 6% on $14,000 
Payment made 
MAR 19, 1973 122 days interest 
at 6% on $14,000 
Payment made 
OCT 26, 1973 221 days interest 
at 6% on $14,000 
Payment made 
NOV 1, 1973 6 days interest 
at 6% on $14,000 
13 
2 
16 
^ 
15 
—m 
15 , 
^ 
1 5 , 
,820 
270 
,000 
,091 
36 
780, 
,348 , 
280. 
500 . 
, 128 . 
5 0 8 . 
500 . 
137 . 
.97 
.25 
.00 
.22 
.82 
.00 
.04 
.76 
,00 
80 
60 
00 
40 
$1,820.97 accrued 
interest, $12,000 
principal 
$2,091.22 accrued 
interest, $14,000 
principal 
$1,348.04 accrued 
interest, $14,000 
principal 
$1,128.80 accrued 
interest, $14,000 
principal 
$1,137.40 accrued 
interest, $14,000 
principal 
13.81 
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Payment due 
NOV 28, 1973 27 days interest 
at 6% on 516,000 
2.000.00 
17,151.21 
Payment made 
MAY 13, 1974 166 days interest 
at 6% on $16,000 
NOV 1, 1974 
Payment made 
172 days interest 
at 6% on $16,000 
Payment due 
71.01 
780.00 
16,442.22 
436.60 
500.00 
16,378.82 
452.38 
2,000.00 
18,831.20 
$1,151.21 accrued 
interest, $16,000 
principal 
$442.22 accrued 
interest, $16,000 
principal 
$378.82 accrued 
interest, $16,000 
principal 
$831.20 accrued 
interest, $18,000 
principal 
JAN 20, 1975 80 days interest 
at 6% on $18,000 
Payment made 
NOV 1, 1975 285 days interest N
 at 6% on $18,000 
236.71 
600.00 
Payment due 
DEC 15, 1975 44 days interest 
at 6% on $20,000 
Payment made 
NOV 1, 1976 321 days interest 
at 6% on $20,000 
-8-
18, 
2, 
21 
20 
1 
r 467. 
843 . 
LpOO. 
, 3 1 1 . 
144, 
500 
7955 
,055 
91 
28 
.00 
; i9 
.66 
.00 
.85 
.34 
$467.91 accrued 
interest, $18,000 
principal 
$1,311.19. accrued 
interest, $20,000 
principal 
$955.85 accrued 
interest, $20,000 
principal 
Payment due 
DEC 1, 1976 30 days interest 
at 6% on $22,000 
Payment made 
NOV 1, 1977 335 days interest 
at 6% on $22,000 
Payment due 
NOV 1, 1978 1 year interest 
at 6% on $24,000 
Payment due 
NOV 1, 1979 1 year interest 
at 6% on $26,000 
Payment due 
NOV 13, 1979 12 days interest 
at 6% on $28,000 
Payment made 
Payment made 
NOV 1, 1980 353 days interest 
at 6% on $28,000 
Payment due 
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2,000.00 
24,011.19 
108.49 
400.00 
23,719.68 
1,211.51 
2,000.00 
26,931.19 
1,440.00 
2,000.00 
30,371.19 
1,560.00 
2,000.00 
33,931.19 
55.23 
706.00 
- 1,300.00 
31,980.42 
1,624.77 
., 2,000.00 
35,605.19 
$2,011.19 accrued 
interest, $22,000 
principal 
$1,719.68 accrued 
interest, $22,000 
principal 
$2,931.19 accrued 
interest, $22,000 
principal 
$4,371.19 accrued 
interest, $26,000 
principal 
$5,931.19 accrued 
interest, $28,000 
principal 
$3,980.42 accrued 
interest, $28,000 
principal 
$5,605.19 accrued 
interest, $30,000 
principal 
JAN 3 1 , 1986 5 y e a r s , 92 days 
in teres t at 6% on 
$30,000 
Payment made 
p o s t - t r i a l af ter 
ruling by Court 
CREDIT (Applied 
below) 
9,453.69 
-50,262.95 
( 5,204.07) 
CONTRACT ACCODHTIHG 
(10% interest on delinqoent amounts 
accruing after Ray 14, 1981) 
NOV 1, 1981 Payment due 
NOV 1, 1982 1 year interst at 
10% on $2,000.00 
Payment due 
NOV 1, 1983 1 year interest at 
10% on $4,000.00 
Payment due 
NOV 6, 1983 5 days inteest at 
10% on $6,000.00 
Payment made 
NOV 1, 1984 360 days Interest 
at 10% on $4,608.22 
Payment due 
NOV 4, 1984 3 days interest at 
10% on $6,608.22 
Payment made 
$ 2,000.00 
200.00 
2,000.00 
4,200.00 
400.00 
2,000.00 
6,600.00 
8.22 
- 2,000.00 
4,608.22 
454.51 
2,000.00 
7,062.73 
5.43 
2,000.00 
$200.00 accrued 
interest, $4,000 
principal 
$600.00 accrued 
interest, $6,000 
principal 
$4,608.22 principal 
$454.51 accrued 
interest $6,608.22 
principal 
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5,068.16 $5,068.16 principal 
NOV 1, 1985 361 days interest 501.26 
at 10% on $5,068.16 
Payment due 2,000.00 
7,569.42 $501.26 interest, 
7,068.16 principal 
NOV 15, 1985 14 days interest at 27.11 
10% on $7,068.16 
Payment made - 2,115.00 
5,481.53 $5,481.53 principal 
JAN 31, 1986 77 days interest at 115.64 
at 10% on $5,481.53 
CREDIT APPLIED - 5,204.07 
$ 399.10 $399.10 principal 
14. As of the date of trial in February of 1985, ELSIE 
BRINKERBOFF was 86 years of age, and is a wonderful and 
beautifully aged lady. 
15. The Court finds by the clear and convincing weight of 
the evidence presented at trial that, although ELSIE BRINKERBOFF 
was fully competent in all senses of the word at the time she 
entered into the agreement between herself as seller and MARK J. 
BRINKERBOFF and CLOYD B. BRINKERBOFF as buyers, in 1966 or 1967, 
because of her age, and beginning in or about 1970, ELSIE 
BRINKERBOFF had to rely on others to do things for her, 
especially concerning her financial and legal affairs, and she 
has relied upon her sons, daughters, members of her family, and 
grandsons, and that from and after 1970, ELSIE BRINKERBOFF signed 
documents that were presented to her without understanding the 
legal or other significance of such documents. She lacked 
sufficient power to comprehend the subject of such documents, 
including will, deeds, contracts and promissory notes, their 
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nature, and their probable consequences, and was not able to act 
with discretion in relation thereto. From and after 1970, ELSIE 
J. BRINKERBOFF was and still is, legally incompetent, 
17. From and after 1970, when ELSIE BRINKERBOFF signed any 
contractual, financial or legal documents, or took certain legal 
stands and positions, she did so in total and strict reliance 
upon her sons, daughters, grandsons or whomever else came to her 
requesting her signature or requesting that she take certain 
legal positionsf all without knowing the nature and probable 
consequences of such documents, and without knowing the nature 
and probable consequences of the legal positions she was 
requested to take. 
18. The Court finds that the purpose of the 1966 or 1967 
Agreement was to furnish ELSIE BRINKERBOFF with support for as 
long as she lived, and that Agreement and that purpose were never 
abandoned. 
19. The Court finds that all of the children and certain 
grandchildren of ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF, from their respective 
viewpoints, and because of what they perceived as being others 
taking advantage of their mother or grandmother by such other 
parties, used their own influence to convince ELSIE BRINKERBOFF 
to execute documents and take legal positions in order to 
accomplish what they, the children and/or grandchildren or other 
relatives, thought was for ELSIE BRINKERBOFF1 s best interest. 
20. The Court finds that the children and grandchildren who 
prevailed upon ELSIE BRINKERBOFF to execute documents and take 
legal stands after 1970 did not intend to take advantage of her 
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for their own purposes. Nevertheless, they did take advantage of 
ELSIE BRINKERHOPF for the purpose of benefiting her in their own 
minds, fro© their own points of view. As a result, those persons 
who persuaded and induced ELSIE BRINKERBOFF to sign contractual, 
legal and financial documents, including deeds, and to take 
certain legal positions from and after 1970, used improper 
constraint or urgency of pursuasion, whereby the will of ELSIE 
BRINKERBOFF was overpowered, and she was induced to do or 
forebear an act which she otherwise would not do, or otherwise 
would do if left to act freely. 
21. The unfair persuasion of ELSIE BRINKERHOPF on various 
occasions from and after 1970 generally took place in private. 
The persons pursuading her to sign legal and financial documents 
were able to obtain her signature because of her age, 
psychological dependency, and existing confidential and/or family 
relationships. 
22. The transactions leading to the signing of financial and 
legal documents by ELSIE BRINKERBOFF were initiated by her family 
members, not by herself/ under circumstances in which ELSIE 
BRINKERBOFF lacked reasonable access to independent, 
non-confidential advice. 
23. Following 1970, ELSIE BRINKERBOFF executed the following 
financial and legal documents, among others: 
A. On or about April 13, 1971, ELSIE BRINKERBOFF 
executed a certain affidavit, admitted in evidence 
as Exhibit P-3. 
•13-
B. On or about April 6, 1977, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF signed 
a document acknowledging that she had received 
$23,000 from MARK J. BRINKERHOFF and CLOYD H. 
BRINKERHOFF as of that date. The receipt was 
prepared by Plaintiff MONT ANDERSON, ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF1S grandson-in-lawf who was and is a 
Certified Public Accountant. The receipt was 
prepared by him for the benefit of giving MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF certain "tax 
breaks"/ and the receipt was prepared and obtained 
without regard to the tax conseguences for ELSIE 
BRINKERBOFF. The receipt was admitted as Exhibit 
P-4. 
C. On or about June 4, 1979, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF executed 
a Warranty Deed running from herself, as grantor, to 
herself, MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, and CLOYD H. 
BRINKERHOFF, as joint tenants. This document was 
admitted as Exhibit D-5. 
D On or about August 15, 1980, ELSIE BRINKERBOFF was 
induced to execute a Warranty Deed running from 
herself, as grantor, to GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN 
BRINKERBOFF, ARLENE B. GOOLDING, CHARLES A. 
BRINKERHOFF, and BETTY B. ESPLIN, each as to an 
undivided 1/5 interest. See Exhibit D-6. 
E. On or following August 15, 1980, GOLDA B. ADAIR, 
WARREN BRINKERBOFF, ARLENE B. GOULDING, CHARLES A. 
BRINKERHOFF, and BETTY B. ESPLIN executed a Trust 
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Deed in favor of ELSIE BRINKERBOFF as beneficiary. 
See Exhibit D-7. The Trust Deed was to secure notes 
running to ELSIE BRINKERBOFF, one being executed by 
each of the grantors named in the Trust Deed. See 
Exhibit D-20. 
F. Also on or about August 15, 1980, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF 
was induced to execute certain "Escrow Agreements". 
See Exhibit D-20. 
G. On or about September 9, 1980, ELSIE BRINKERBOFF was 
induced to execute a Quit Claim Deed, conveying 
interests in water rights to GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN 
BRINKERBOFF, ARLENE B. GODLDING, CHARLES A. 
BRINKERHOFF, and BETTY B. ESPLIN, each as to an 
undivided 1/5 interest. See Exhibit D-8. 
H. On or about September 9, 1980, ELSIE BRINKERBOFF was 
induced to execute a certain affidavit. See Exhibit 
D-21. 
I. On or about April 23, 1982, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF 
executed a document entitled "Last Will and 
Testament of ELSIE BRINKERHOFF". 
J. On or about September 9, 1984, ELSIE BRINKERBOFF was 
induced to execute a certain "Stipulation". See 
Exhibit P-40. 
24. The Court specifically finds that with respect to each 
and all of the documents listed in the preceding paragraph, the 
same were signed by ELSIE BRINKERHOFF when she was legally 
incompetent, and was acting and functioning under the undue 
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influence of the persons who obtained her signature, or who 
requested her to take the legal positions indicated by said 
documents. As a result, the Court finds that all legal, 
contractual financial and testamentary documents executed by 
ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF from and after 1970, as between and as 
related to the parties to this action, are null, void, and of no 
force or effect whatever, and should be declared cancelled. 
25. On or about August 15, 1980, GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN 
BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. GOOLDING, CHARLES A. BRINKBRHOFP and BETTY 
B. ESPLIN executed notes in favor of ELSIE J. BRINKERBOPP in 
connection with the Warranty Deed, Trust Deed, and Escrow 
Agreement mentioned in paragraphs 23D, 23 E, and 23F, above. 
Thereafter, certain payments were made by the promisors to ELSIE 
J. BRINKERHOFP. The notes bore interest at the rate of *NONE 
percent (0%) per annum*. 
26. At trial, the Court inquired of GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN 
BRINKERBOPP, ARLENE B. GOOLDING, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFP, and 
BETTY B, ESPLIN whether they desired the return of funds paid by 
them to ELSIE J. BRINKBRHOFP under the transactions mentioned in 
light of the Court's ruling that said transactions were null, 
void, and of no effect* CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFP an£ BETTY B. 
ESPLIN informed the Court that they did not desire any repayment. 
Defendants GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERBOFF, and ARLENE B. 
GOOLDING requested that their money be returned to them by ELSIE 
J, BRINKERHOPF, who requested that the Court grant her the 
privilege of repaying said Defendants. The Court finds that the 
notes to ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF, the Trust Deed, the Escrow 
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Agreement and all other documents related to the transactions 
described above are null, void, of no effect and should be 
cancelled and set aside. 
27. As of February 28, 1985, ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF is 
indebted to Defendants GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERBOFF, AND 
ARLENE B. GOOLDING in the principal amount of $1,620.00 plus 
accrued interest at the rate of 10% per annum in the amount of 
$356.40, for a total amount of $1,976.40, each. 
28. As stated in paragraph 7, above, the contract between 
ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF, MARK J. BRINKERBOFF, and CLOYD H. 
BRINKERBOFF was and is vague and ambiguous with respect to 
disposition of any portion of the $53,388.00 minimum which might 
remain unpaid as of the date of death of ELSIE J* BRINKERBOFF. 
The Court finds that it was the intent of the parties to the 
contract that any part of the minimum amount remaining unpaid as 
of the death of ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF be paid and divided equally 
between her children, or any surviving heirs if any child 
predeceased her, and the contract should be reformed to express 
clearly this disposition and intent* As of the dates of trial, 
all children of ELSIE J» BRINKERBOFF, including the surviving 
spouse of CLOTD H* BRINKERBOFF, consented to such reformation, 
with the exception of Defendants ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERBOFF, and 
GOOLDING, who originally agreed to such reformation but changed 
their minds. Likewise as of the time of trial, all children of 
ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF except Defendants ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERBOFF, 
and GOOLDING were in agreement that any and all funds left in a 
trust account mentioned below, as of the date of death of ELSIE 
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J. BRINKERBOFF, be divided and distributed equally between them 
and LENA BRINKERBOFF. Defendants ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERBOFF and 
GOOLDING originally agreed, but changed their minds. The Court 
finds that all funds referred to in this paragraph should be 
distributed, upon the death of ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF, equally to 
her children, with LENA BRINKERBOFF receiving the share allocable 
to her deceased husband, GLOYD B. BRINKERBOFF. 
29. Any amounts awarded to ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF should be 
paid to Mr* Kirk Beaton in trust for the benefit of ELSIE J. 
BRINKERBOFF, and for the use and benefit of her now-surviving 
children and LENA BRINKERBOFF. Mr. Beaton was present in Court 
at the time of the Court's ruling and consented to be appointed 
as trustee and guardian of the financial, business and legal 
affairs of ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF, under the supervision of the 
Court. Mr. Kirk Beaton should be appointed as such trustee and 
guardian for the purpose of receiving such funds awarded to ELSIE 
J. BRINKERBOFF, depositing them in a trust account at Eion's 
First National Bank, and disbursing them appropriately, but not 
to any of ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF1 S children except as specifically 
ordered by^ the Court. He should qualify by taking the 
appropriate oath, and should serve without bond or any stated 
fee, but should be permitted to apply to the Court for reasonable 
fees upon appropriate showing and notice. 
30. When this action vas originally commenced, Willard R. 
Bishop, attorney for Plaintiffs, brought suit against ELSIE 
BRINKERBOFF and other naaed Defendants. Thereafter, the 
interests ot ELSIE BRINKERBOFF were represented by Bans Q. 
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Chamberlain, who also represented other named Defendants. ELSIE 
BRINKERHOPF then requested in writing that Bans Q. Chamberlain 
withdraw as her attorney of record, which he did in September of 
1983. The letter wherein she requested Bans Q. Chamberlain to 
withdraw as her attorney was prepared by her grandson, DALE 
BRINKERBOFP. Thereafter, following signing of the September 9, 
1984 Stipulation by ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFP, and following receipt 
of a w itten request from ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF dated October 16, 
1984f Willard R. Bishop, entered an appearance on her behalf and 
represented ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF even though he had originally 
sued her on behalf of Plaintiffs in the first instance, Hans Q. 
Chamberlain had by then sued ELSIE J, BRINKERBOFF in behalf of 
the other named Defendants even though he originally represented 
her, by a Crossclaim dated September 28f 1984. 
31. During the first day of trial, to-wit, February 21st, 
1985, the Court determined that the interests of ELSIE 
BRINKERBOFF were not being fully protected, and by reason of that 
fact, she needed separate counsel to represent her interests. 
The Court deteruined that it would watch out for the interests of 
SLSIE BRINKERBOFF, and that the trial would continue without 
obtaining counsel to represent her during the course of the 
trial. Therefore, during part of the first day of trial and 
during the entire second day of trial, ELSIE BRINKERBOFF was not 
represented by counsel. 
From the foregoing Findings of Pact, the Court now makes and 
enters its; 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That any and all legal, financial, testamentary, 
contractual and/or other documents executed by ELSIE J. 
BRINKERBOFF from and after the year 1970, as between and as 
related to the parties to this action, were and are null, void 
and of no effect by reason of the legal incompetency of ELSIE J. 
BRINKERBOFF and the exercise of undue influence over her in 
connection with the execution of said documents, by certain of 
her children and grandchidren, and should be declared to be null, 
void, cancelled terminated, and of no effect whatever, as should 
any promissory notes, trust deeds, escrow agreements and any 
other documents executed by others, but related thereto. 
2. The Agreement between ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF as seller, and 
MARK J. BRINKERBOFF and CLOYD B. BRINKERBOFF, deceased, dated 
October 26, 1966 or December 10, 1967
 r is and at all times 
pertinent has been, in existence, and in full force and effect. 
3. That the vague and ambiguous terms of said Agreement 
pertaining to disposition of any part of the minimum amount of 
$53,388.00 remaining unpaid as of the death of ELSIE J. 
BRINKERBOFF, should be reformed to provide for an equal division 
of any amounts so remaining between MARK J. BRINKERBOFF, LENA 
BRIKKERBOFP, CBARLBS A. BRIHKERBOFF, BBCTY B. ESPLIN, GOLDA B. 
ADAIR, KARREH BRIHKERBOFF, and ARLENE B. GOOLDING, share and 
share alike. 
4. Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment and a decree quieting 
title with appropriate injunctive relief in favor of LENA 
BRINKERBOFF and MARK J. BRINKERBOFF in the real and personal 
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property, grazing rights and water rights which are the subject 
matter of this action, as tenants in common, each owning an 
undivided one-half (H) interest therein, subject to the terms of 
the Agreement dated October 26, 1966 or December 10, 1967, as 
reformed, running to ELSIE J. BRINKEREOFF as seller, free and 
clear of any claim whatever on the part of Defendants GOLDA B. 
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKEREOFF, and ARLENE B. 60ULDING. Because of 
the legal incompetency of ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF, upon payment of 
all amounts due under said Agreement, any judgment and decree 
issued in this matter should function and operate as a judicial 
deed conveying to Plaintiffs MARK J. BRINKERBOFF and LENA 
BRINKERBOFF, the interests stated above. In the event that 
Plaintiffs deem it necessary, a judicial deed should issue upon 
appropriate application and notice. 
5. That Mr. Kirk Beaton should be appointed as trustee and 
guardian of the financial, business and legal affairs of ELSIE J. 
BRINKERBOFF, under the supervision of the Court, he to take the 
appropriate oath and to serve without bond or stated fee. As 
such trustee and guardian, Mr. Beaton should receive amounts 
^awarded SLSIB J* BRINKERBOFF, should deposit them in a trust 
"account at lion's First National Bank, and should disburse such J 
funds for the benefit of SLSIE J. BRINKERBOFF, but not to her 
7
 children, except as such disbursements to children may be ordered 
by the Court. Upon appropriate notice, Mr. Beaton should be 
permitted to apply for reasonable fees in his capacity as trustee 
and guardian of the financial business and legal affairs of ELSIE 
t
r
 J. BRINKERBOFF. Mr. Beaton should be permitted to pay his 
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reasonable costs incurred for his administration of the account, 
from the account. 
6. That Plaintiffs should be required to pay to Kirk Heaton, 
in trust for the use and benefit of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, the 
amounts due on the Agreement as stated above, plus any accrued 
interest, said amounts to be paid within ninety (90) days of the 
execution of any judgment by the Court in this matter. 
7. That from amounts received by Mr. Kirk Beaton for the 
benefit of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, Mr. Beaton should be required to 
disburse to Defendants GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, and 
ARLENE B. GOOLDING, the amount of $1,976.40 each, together with 
interest upon said amount at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per 
annum from and after March lf 1985, all without further order of 
this Court. 
8. That upon the death of ELSIE J* BRINKERHOFF, Kirk Beaton, 
in his capacity as trustee, should be required to pay and 
distribute any and all funds still being held by him in trust for 
ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, together with any funds received by him 
thereafter in connection with the Agreement of October 26, 1966 
or December 10, 1967, to MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, LENA BRINKERHOFF, 
BETTY Be ESPLIN, CHARLES A. BRINKERSOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN 
BRINKERHOFF, and ARLENE B. GOOLDISG equally, share and share 
alike, 
9. That all other claims and pleadings of any party 
requesting affirmative relief other than or inconsistent with the 
above conclusions, should be dismissed, with prejudice and upon 
the merits^ 
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10. The p a t t i e s should be required to bear t h e i r own cos t s 
and attorney f ee s . 
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 
DATED t h i s ,%? ~ d a y of /lp\fjtf '*/ 1986. 
ZCQtrRTi BY THE 
1
 v * :^u^.. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
\ DON V.^TIBBS, D i s t r i c t Judge 
Ufl 
WILLARD R. B I S H O P ^ T 
Attorney for Plaintiffs N 
HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN 
Attorney for Defendants ADAIR, 
GOOLDING, and WARREN BRINKERBOFF 
<t 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I sailed a full, true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing FIRST AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to Mr. Hans Q. Chamberlain, of CHAMBERLAIN & 
HIGBEE, Attorneys at Law, 250 South Main Street, Cedar City, Utah" 
• * — - * 
• *> '" - -T_ '""^  
84720; to Mr. Xirk Heaton, Attorney at Law, 70 North Main Street, 
Kanab, Utah 84741; and to Mrs. Elsie J. Brinkerhoff, Glendale, 
Utah 84729, all by first class mail, postage fully prepaid this 
<2gHday of fe&gOAgV , 1986. 
c 
-fctn JMmju^kijwD 
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WILLARD R. BISHOP 
BISHOP & RONNOK, P. C. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
P. 0. Box 27 9 
Cedar City, DT 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-9483 
IH THB SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COORT OP KANE COOHTY 
STATE OP DTAH 
I I I i l II I I I • 1111 I I I I III I * • • ! I • • • H I ! • I l l • • I i • I , 
MONT R. ANDERSON, personal ) 
representative of the Estate ) 
of CLOYD B. BRINKERBOFF, ) 
LENA BRINKERBOFF, and MARK J. ) 
BRINKERBOFF, ) FIRST AMENDED JUDGMENT AND 
) DECREE Q01BTING TITLE 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ) 
ELSIE BRINKERBOFF, GOLDAB. ) Civil No. 1826 
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERBOFF, ) 
ARLENE B. GOULDING, and JOBN ) 
DOES I through V, ) 
Defendants. ) 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial to the 
Court, sitting without a jury, on Thursday and Friday, February 
21 and 22, 1985. Plaintiffs MONT R. ANDERSON, as personal 
representative of the Estate of CLOYD B. BRINKERBOFF, LENA 
BRINKERBOFF and MARK J. BRINKERBOFF all appeared personally and 
were represented by their counsel of record, Mr. Willard R. 
Bishop. Defendant ELSIE BRINKERBOFF appeared personally and was 
represented by her attorney of record, Mr. Willard R. Bishop. 
Defendants GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERBOFF, and ARLENE B. 
GODLDING also appeared personally, and were represented by their 
attorney of record, Mr. Bans Q. Chamberlain. CBARLES A. 
BRINKERBOFF and BETTY B. ESPLIN were present. The Court noted 
bat originally, CEARLES A. BRINKERBOFF and BETTY B. ESPLIN had 
been named as Defendants, but had been dismissed from the lawsuit 
by reason of having settled their differences with Plaintiffs. 
Witnesses were sworned and evidence was presented. Argument was 
had. The Court being fully advised in the premises, and having 
heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, and good cause appearing, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. That any and all legal, financial, testamentary, 
contractual and/or other documents executed by ELSIE J. 
BRINKERBOFF from and after 1970, as between and as related to the 
parties to this action, were and are now, null, void, and of no 
effect whatever, by reason of the legal incompetency of ELSIE J. 
BRINKERBOFF and by reason of the exercise of undue influence over 
her in connection with the execution of said documents, by 
certain of her children and grandchildren, and said documents 
should be and they hereby are, declared to be null, void, 
cancelled, terminated, and of no effect whatever, together with 
any and all related promissory notes, trust deeds, escrow 
agreements, and any and all other documents executed by others 
related to in any way to the null and void documents executed by 
ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF* The documents which are hereby declared 
null, void and of no effect include, but are not limited to, the 
following: 
A. A certain affidavit executed by ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF 
on or about April 13, 1971. 
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A certain document executed by ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF 
on or about April 6, 1977, acknowledging that she 
had received $23,000.00 from MARK J. BRINKERHOFF and 
CLOYD B. BRINKERHOFF as of that date. 
A certain Warranty Deed dated June 4, 1975, running 
from ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, as grantor, to herself, 
MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, as 
joint tenants. 
A certain Warranty Deed dated August 15, 1980, 
running from ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, as grantor, to 
GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. 
GODLDING, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF, and BETTY B. 
ESPLIN, each as to an undivided one-fifth (1/5) 
interest. 
A certain Trust Deed executed by GOLDA B. ADAIR, 
WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B, GODLDING, CHARLES A. 
BRINKERHOFF, and BETTY B. ESPLIN, running to ELSIE 
J. BRINKERHOFF, as beneficiary, together with 
certain trust deed notes running to ELSIE J. 
BRINKERHOFF from GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, 
ARLENE B. GODLDING, CHARLES A. BRINKER0OFF, and 
BETTY B. ESPLIN, executed on or about August 15, 
1930. 
Certain 'Escrow Agreements* dated August 15, 1980, 
executed by ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, and by GOLDA B. 
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. GOULDING, 
CHARLES A. BRINFERBOFF, and BETTY B. ESPLIN. 
G. A certain Quit-Claim Deed, purporting to convey 
interests in water rights to GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN 
BRINKERBOFF, ARLENE B. GOULDING, CHARLES A. 
BRINKERHOFF, and BETTY B. ESPLIN, each to an 
undivided one-fifth (1/5) interest, executed by 
ELSIE BRINKERBOFF on or about September 9, 1980. 
H. A certain affidavit, executed by ELSIE BRINKERHOFF 
on or about September 9, 1980. 
I. A certain "Last Will and Testament of ELSIE 
BRINKERBOFF", executed by ELSIE BRINKERHOFF on or 
about April 23, 1982. 
J. A certain "Stipulation" executed by ELSIE 
BRINKERBOFF on or about September 9, 1984. 
2. That the agreement between ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF as 
seller, and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, 
deceased, dated October 26, 1966 or December 10, 1967, should be 
and it hereby is, declared to be in existence, and in full force 
and effect. 
3. That the terms of said agreement pertaining to 
disposition of any part of the minimum amount of 553,388.00 
remaining unpaid as of the death of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, should 
be and they hereby are, reformed, to provide for an equal 
division of any amounts so remaining between MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, 
LENA BRINKERBOFF, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF, BETTY B. ESPLIN, GOLDA 
B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERBOFF, and ARLENE B. GOULDING, share and 
share alike. 
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4. That Plaintiffs LENA BRINKERHOFF and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, 
own in fee simple and are entitled to the quiet and peaceful use, 
possession and enjoyment of that certain real and personal 
property, including grazing rights and water rights, as tenants 
in common, each owning an undivided one-half (**) interest 
therein, subject to the terms of the Agreement dated October 26, 
1966, or December 10, 1967, as reformed, running to ELSIE J. 
BRINKERBOFF as seller, said real and personal property, including 
grazing and water rights, being more particularly described as 
follows: 
REAL PROPERTY IN MILLARD COOHTY, DTAH: 
Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4, Block 25, Plat "A", Delta 
Townsite. 
Lot 2, Block 26, Plat "A", Delta Townsite. 
REAL PROPERTY IN KANE COUNTY, DTAB: 
Township 39 South, Range 4^ West, Salt Lake 
Meridian: 
West Half of Section 25, containing 320 acres* 
Northwest Quarter? Southeast Quarter and the 
South Half of the Northeast Quarter containing 
400 acres, all in Section 26, Township 39 
South, Range 4H West, Salt Lake Meridian, 
containing 400 acres, more or less. 
Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4; Southeast Quarter of the 
Northwest Quarter; Northeast Quarter of the.. 
Southwest Quarter; East Half of the East Half; 
Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter; 
Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of 
Section 27, Township 39 South, Range Ah West, 
containing 478.80 acres. 
East Half of the Northeast Quarter? South Half 
of the Southeast Quarter; Northwest Quarter of 
the Southeast Quarter of Section 35, 
containing 200 acres. 
c 
Township 40 South, Range 4H West, Salt Lake 
Meridian: 
Section 29: Southwest Quarter of the 
Northeast Quarter; West Half of the Southeast 
Quarter and the Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter, containing 160 acres. 
Section 30: Northwest Quarter; East Half of 
the Southwest Quarter, containing 238.99 
acres. 
Section 5: Lot 2, containing 39.08 acres. 
Township 40 South, Range 4 West, Salt Lake 
Meridian: 
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of 
Section 8, containing 40 acres. 
Township 40 South, Range 7 West, Salt Lake 
Meridian: 
Beginning at the Southwest Corner of the 
Southwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of 
Section 23, Township 40 South, Range 7 West, 
Salt Lake Meridian and running thence Cast 
10.23 chains; thence North 80° West 6.36 
chains; thence West 3.68 chains; thence South 
1 chain to beginning, containing .74 acres. 
Beginning at the Northwest Corner of the 
Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of 
Section 26, Township 40 South, Range 7 West, 
and running thence South 4.30 chains; thence 
South 70° East 15 chains to the middle of the 
channel of the creek; thence Northwesterly 
along the middle of the channel of said creek 
to the North line of said Northwest Quarter of 
the Northeast Quarter; thence West 11.23 
chains to the place of beginning. 
Beginning 4.30 chains South of the Northwest*' 
Corner of the Northwest Quarter of the 
Northeast Quarter of Section 26, Township 40 
South, Range 7 West, Salt Lake Meridian and 
running thence South 70°east 15 chains to the 
middle of the channel of the creek; thence 
Southerly along the middle of the channel of 
said creek to the South Line; thence North 73 
45' Kest 14.60 chains; thence North 4.30 
chains to the place of beginning, containing 
5.60 acres. 
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The above three tracts being part of land 
situtated in Sections 23 and 26 of said 
township and range, sometimes referred to 
unofficially as Lot "A". 
Township 40 South, Range Ah West, Salt Lake 
Meridian: 
Lot 1; Northeast Quarter of the Northwest 
Quarter of Section 31, containing 79.30 acres. 
PERSONAL PROPERTY: 
The following described water and reservoir 
rights: 
A one-fourth interest in Hobble Canyon 
Reservoir (9-36-12) in Mohave County, Arizona, 
A one-half interest in Sullivan Reservoir in 
Mohave County, Arizona. 
And all grazing privileges and permits annexed 
to or based upon any of the foregoing real, 
personal, reservoir, or water rights as 
commensurate. 
5. That the claims of Defendants GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN 
BRINKERBOFF, and ARLENE B. GODLDING, and the claims of any and 
all persons claiming with, by, through or under said Defendants, 
are without any right whatever, and Defendants GOLDA B. ADAIR, 
WARREN BRINKERBOFF, and ARLENE B. GOOLDING and any and all 
persons claiming with, by, through or under them, have no estate, 
right, title, lien or interest in or to said property or any part 
thereof* 
6. That Defendants GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, and 
ARLENE B. GOOLDING, and any and all persons claiming with, by, 
through or under them, should be and they hereby are, permanently 
enjoined and restrained from claiming any estate, right, title, 
lien or interest in or to the described property or any part 
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thereof adverse to the interests and title of MARK J. BRINKERHOFF 
and LENA BRINKERBOFF. 
7. That because of the legal incompetency of ELSIE J. 
BRINKERBOFF and the fact that a complete set of documents of 
conveyance was never deposited into the escrow anticipated by the 
agreement dated October 26, 1966 or December 10, 1967, this 
Judgment and Decree Quieting Title shall, upon the death of ELSIE 
J. BRINKERBOFF, function and operate as a judicial deed conveying 
to MARK J. BRINKERBOFF and LENA BRINKERBOFF the interests stated 
above. In the event that MARK J. BRINKERBOFF and/or LENA 
BRINKERBOFF deem it necessary, a judicial deed shall issue upon 
appropriate application and notice. 
8. That Mr. Kirk Beaton, Attorney, of Kanab, Dtah, should be 
and he hereby is, appointed as guardian of the financial, 
business and legal affairs of ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF, and as 
trustee of all funds flowing to ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF from the 
Agreement of October 26, 1966 or December 10, 1967, for the use 
and benefit of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, and also for the use and 
benefit of MARK J. BRINKERBOFF, LENA BRINKERBOFF, BETTY B. 
ESPLIN, CHARLES A. BRINKERBOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN 
BRINKERBOFF, and ARLERE B* GOOLDING, said appointments being 
subject to the supervision of this Court. Mr. Kirk Beaton shall 
take the appropriate oath and shall serve without bond or stated 
fee. As such trustee, Mr. Beaton shall receive all amounts 
awarded ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF herein, together with any proceeds 
from the agreement dated October 26, 1366 or December 10, 1967, 
as reformed above, and shall deposit them into a trust account at 
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Zion's First National Bank, and shall hold and disburse such 
funds for the use and benefit of ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF, but not to 
her children, except as such disbursements to children may be 
specifically authorized herein# or otherwise ordered by the 
Court. Upon appropriate application and notice, Mr. Kirk Heaton 
shall be permitted to apply for reasonable fees in connection 
with his administration of the trust, and in connection with his 
guardianship of the financial, business and legal affairs of 
ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF. Mr. Kirk Beaton shall be permitted to 
deduct his reasonable and normal costs incurred in connection 
with his administration of the trust, from the trust corpus. 
9. That Plaintiffs should be and they hereby are, required 
to pay to Kirk Heaton, as trustee, for the use and benefit of 
ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF and for the use and benefit of MARK J. 
BRINKERBOFF, LENA H. BRINKERBOFF, BETTY B. ESPLIN, CHARLES A. 
BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERBOFF, and ARLENE B. 
GOULDING, the sum of $399.10, being the amount due and unpaid on 
the agreement as of January 31, 1986, plus any accrued interest 
at ten percent (10%) per annum upon principal, and less any 
payments made after January 31
 f 1986, said amount to be paid 
within ninety (90) days of the execution of this Fitfit Amended 
Judgment, Plaintiffs having already paid the sum of $50/262.S5 on 
January 31, 1986, and $2,115.00 on November 15, 1985, after the 
initial ruling by the Court. 
10. That from amounts received by Mr. Kirk Beaton as stated 
above, and as received by him prior to February 1, 1986, Mr. 
Beaton should be and he hereby is, required to disburse forthwith 
-9-
to Defendant GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERBOFF, and ARLENE B. 
GOULDING, the amount of $1,916.40 each, together with interest 
upon said amounts at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum 
from and after March 1, 1985, all without further order of this 
Court. 
11. That upon the death of ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF, Mr. Kirk 
Beaton, in his capacity as trustee, should be and he hereby is, 
required to pay and distribute any and all funds still being held 
by him in trust at the death of ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF, together 
with any funds received by him thereafter in connection with the 
agreement of October 26, 1966 or December 10, 1967, to MARK J. 
BRINKERBOFF, LENA BRINKERBOFF, BETTY B. ESPLIN, CHARLES A. 
BRINKERBOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERBOFF, and ARLENE B. 
GOOLDING equally, share and share alike. 
12. That any and all other claims and pleadings of any party 
in this action requesting affirmative relief, other than or 
inconsistent with the above, should be and they hereby are, 
dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits. 
13. That the parties should be and they hereby are, required 
to bear their own costs and attorney fees. 
DATED this 20 day of f^hVuA 
^ BY THE COt 
N 
V 
+ y 1986. 
/I ILK -. 
I ' —ui nn r-1 " f i r ~- i ir i i T I I • i TIIHIIT run i T u i m r i r i 
DON V. TIBBS, District Judge 
\ WILLARD R. BISHOP Attorney for P l a i n t i f f s 
- 1 0 -
. r - ' ' r - •- ,~ ~ — L - s - : 
HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN 
. Attorney for Defendants ADAIR, 
MOULDING, and WARREN BRINKERHOPF 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing FIRST AMENDED JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
QDIETING TITLE, to Mr. Bans Q. Chamberlain, of CHAMBERLAIN & 
HIGBEE, Attorneys at Law, 250 South Main Street, Cedar City, Otah 
84720; to Mr. Kirk Beaton, Attorney at Law, 70 North Main Street, 
Kanab, Otah 84741; and to Mrs. Elsie J. Brinkerhoff, Glendale, 
Otah 84729, all by first class mail, postage fully prepaid this 
day of FBfiZUARY _^__, 1986. 
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Or 
A G R E E M E H T^^ '^^S^rV // 
THIS AGREEMENT, mode and antcrod Into by and botw?on ELSIEf SRINXERHGFi 
of Glands fe , Coynty of fono, State of Utah, PARTY OF THE FIRST PART, here in-
a f t e r ro1*rro4 to as tho "SELLER" and CLOYD H. BZU&iZZOcF and MARS SRIWKERiSfF 
of Glandalo, County of tana. State of Utah, PARTIES OF THE SECOND PART, r,©relti-
a f t e r reforrod to as tho "CUYCRS*, 
HilMllil!!5 
THAT UHZRSAS, tho SELLER Is the &*mr of 1h* real property', ?.r2zlnr. 
.prfvl logos and wtar rights In tho Statos of Utah and Arizona; 
AIO WHEREAS, tho BUYERS das fro to purchase tho ZCGIQI 
AND WHEREAS, the perries havo agrood upon terns and conditions tor thej 
sale thereof; 
HOt! THEREFORE, In consideration of tho prenlses and of tve ritual 
covenants and agreements hereinafter set exit tho parties hereinafter agr&o *lth 
and betvocn ono ancthor as follows: 
1 , Thot for and In consideration of tho to ta l stm of FIFTY THEfc'E 
THOUSAND TWEE HUNDRED EIGHTY-EIGHT ($33,325.00) DOLLARS, as tho f u l l considers-] 
tJoe therefor , tho SELLER covenants and agrees to eel J and tho-BUYERS covenant 
end egroo to buy tho following described rea l property, grazing prlvl ic^cs and 
water and reservoir f ights In the States of Utah and Arizona: 
REAL PROPERTY Ui MILLARD COtWTY, UTAHt 
Lois t , 2 f 3 , snti 4 , Block 25, P la t "A", Delta Towns!te. 
Lot 2 , Block 26, P la t nA», (to I to Tovnslte 
REAL PROPERTY IK KANE COUNTY, UTAH: 
Township 39 South, Range Ai Kest, S.^lt Lake Marfdlen: 
Vest !>alf oi Sf>ctlon 25, containing 320 ecres. 
Uoctht-est Quortor* Southeast Ouartcr and tho Sooth Ho if 
of iho Northeast Quarter coritr.lning 0 0 ceres, a l l in 
Section ?•:-, Tonnsnlp JJ South, Remjs 4 f V>*st, SaJt lako 
Meridian, containing 0 0 acres, wore or loss. 
l o t * l f 2, 3, ami i.\ Southo.ist fr.zrtor o* tho North-
west Qyortor; N\y-*f*;t>ort (juartor of tho Southeast 
" Qvartar; Ccjf H j i f of tho Co'st K u f ; S-*»?tn<ast C a r t e r 
oi the florth^jst CSj^rlcr; lior thwort ',«v;jrtor of ti*v? 
Southeast C a r t e r oi Tcciion 27, lovmr-Mp 3V South, 
Rr.-.ga 4f V.ort, containing ;7S.S;> ccros. 
PLAINTIFFS 
EXHIBIT 
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Eest Half of the Worthoost Quarter; South Half of the 
Southeast Qit.'trtor; Worthiest <>jar*or of tho Southeast 
Quarter of Section 35, containing 203 acres. 
Township 40 South, Range 4 i West, Sa l t Lako HurldlAnt 
Section 29: Southwest Quarter of tho Northeast Quarter; 
Kost Half of the Southeast Qv-arior and tho Southoast Quarter 
of the Southwest Quarter, containing 160 acres. 
Section 30: Northwest Quarter; East Hi If of the Southwost 
Quarter, containing 233-99 acres. 
Section 5: Lot 2, containing 3- .33 acres. 
Tovnshlp 40 South, Range 4 West, So I t take Meridian: 
South*oct Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 8, 
containing 40 acres. 
Township 40 South, Rang© 7 West. Sal t Lai;e Meridian: 
Beginning at tho Southeast Corner of the Southwest Quartor of 
tho Southeast Quarter of Section 23, Tovnshla 40 South, Ran'jo 
7 ttost. Sa l t Lake Meridicn and running thence East 1 0 . 3 
chains; thcoco North 80* Vest 6.36 chains; thence West 3.6o 
chains; thenco South \ chain to beginning, containing .74 
acres. 
Dog Inn Inn a t tho fJorthwest Cornor of tho Korth\yect Quarter o r ^ 
the Northeast Quarter of Section 20, Township 40 South, Hinge 
7 V.'ost, and running thoncer Sooth 4.30 chains; thence South 7 0 ' 
East 15 chains to tho middle of the channel of the creek; thenco 
Korthvicctorly ciong tho *ni dd lo of the channel of said crook to 
the Worth Lino of sale Horthr;ast Q-uortor of the Northeast 
Quarter; thof>co Vest 11.23 chains to tho place of ooglnnlng. 
Doginning 4.30 chains South of the Worthiest Cornor of tho 
Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 2C9 
Township 40 South, Range 7 l o s t , Sai t Lake Meridian and run-
ning thonco South 70* Esst 15 chains to tho .-nlddlo of tho 
chanr>oi of the creek; thence Southerly along the middle of 
the channel of said creek to tho South Line; t^o.nco fiorth 
73*45' f e s t 14,60 chains; thenco North 4.30 chains to tho 
pieco of beginning, containing 5,60 acres. ^ 
Th* obevtj throo 1r*ctc being oart of land situated In Sections 
23 ond 7t of f.a?d township and ronee, sometimes roforrod to 
unof f ic ia l l y ac Lot "A". 
7c*T,sh!p ^0 South, Ran.j& 4{ V.'ost, S^lt U * e Meridian: 
Lot \\ Karthcist Cvartor of the Nor-fhwst C^jrtor of Section 
3 1 , cental King 7".30 acres. 
I 
4 
•5* 
PERSONAL PROPERTY! 
*\ The following described voter and reservoir rights: 
A one-fourth Interest In Mobblo Canyon Reservoir (9-36-lf) 
In Mohave County, Arizona, 
A one half Interest In Sullivan Roscrvolr In Mohave County, 
Arizona. 
And a l l grazing prlvl logos and poralt3 annoxed to or bctsod 
upon any of the foregoing real , personal, reservoir, or u-a*ror 
rights as cojnensurate. 
2. The parties agree that for and In consideration of the salo by tho 
SELLER to the BUYERS of tho foregoing real and personal property, wator ^nd 
reservoir rights and grazing prlvl legos, tho RATERS wl II pay to the SELLER i to 
sua of T«VO THOUSAJJD ($2,030.03) DOLLARS, each year, beginning with the 1st day 
of Hovenbor, 1964, of *hich payments due on November 1, 1964 and r2o-<.«n!«cr 1, 
1965 <iro hereby acknowledged by the SELLER fro* tho GLTfEnS and the OUTEHS will 
continue to pay annual I n^ta I laonts of S2.000.00 on the 1st day of No vaster In 
each year thereafter beginning November 1, 1966 and continuing during the entire 
l i fe of the SELLER. 
The HJYERS ogres that they wi I I pay the sua of 52,000,00 ?or your to 
the SELLER for tho ontiro roaaindor of SELLERS II fo Irrespective of tho «aount| 
which ©ay be paid undor this contract whether I t exceeds the total consideration 
hereinabove sot out or whether that total amount shall not be paid by applying 
annua I _gayaents of 32, OX. 00 against the purchase price during the l i fe ti-no of 
the SELLER and in consideration of an undertaking by the DUYERS to pay tho 
mount of $2,000.00 per year for the l i fe of tho SELLER Irrespective of tho 
aacunt which evay be paid, the SELLERjwalvos interest upon the w ^ J A to*,—os* 
I t Is provided, howevor, that should the total consideration herein-
above provldod not bo paid by the emrERS to tho 5ELLER during SELLER'S lifetime! 
then upon the death of the SELLER any o-wunts remaining under this Agrccrscnt j 
after crediting a i l parents which have boon aado horoyndor, shall be paid 
annually us prov!<J>d borjln In 9qysi shares, stores end share alike, to 
- 4 -
ttarren Brlnherhoff and Charley ArJand Brlnlcorhoff tvo-sovenths (2/7ths> 0 / 7 t h s 
to each) of tho bolonces due ( I t being st ipulated that the GUYERS together *ltt> | 
Varren &-lnkorhof<, Chorloy Arlend Brlnkerhoff , Batty B. EspI In , Goldo B. Ad3ir,| 
and Arlcno B. Gouldlng consti tute a l l the heirs at law of the SELLER and that | 
other provision has boon cade for tho la t te r thrco naraed h e i r s ) , together * I t h 
Interest at Jour {£$) par cont par enrujn on the doferrod declining jvaUinces. 
The ELMERS siay, at any tlrao f prepay a l l or any psri of the regaining 
principal duo under t h i s contract . 
5. Tho SELLER shn 11 exocute o v arrant*/ Dood to the rea I pro^r-ry 
hereinabove described srid quitclaim conveyances to the t*atcr ond reservoir 
r ights hcrelnafove described, of en undivided one half Interest to ench QUYER 
and his v i f e 03 j o i n t tenants with f a l l r ights of survivorship, and shsll 
deposit said Instruments In tho Hurricane Branch of the Bank of S t . George | 
t&hlch shall hold those docu*»>cnts In t r u s t ond In escrov subject to tho following!: 
ESCROW IHSTRLCTICfJS 
I f the gUYEKS _s>a ILmako a 11 poymonts of principal ond Interest herein 
provided ond perfona a l l the other covenants and agreements herein contained, 
then upon payt?>ent of the f i n a l I n s t a l H o n t due >iereanderj;heEscrow Depository 
shall dellvor to tho &TTEES a l l tho escrowed drjcu-nents. 
In the ovent of a default In the payrnent of any Instatl'scnt of principal! 
or Interest and In the ov€ir\i of a default In any other term or condition herein j 
end In tho event notice of a default other than for payrront of principal ond 
Interest shall to given to tho 5JYERS by the SELLER and a oubsec^ont fa! lure I 
to r o * c y the sr.-as t h a l l continue for a period of t h i r t y (305 days, thon the 
SELLER cvry, at her option, C<x>'*4 a rt>w-e l ivery to her of cIS of tho t-zzr-yvdiS 
doevsnants vhoreupon the wU/ERS v l l l vacate and po-<cobly surrender n i l o1 tho j 
premises here I nab a ve cfoscribod end the SELLER ~*y ro-enter I r.te poose^'loncf 
She $•&*& without further p-xess and cray re ta in as-rent &nd |» quivered dcrroges | 
a l l terra ti<-roiOfc-re r^sld by &JY££S uncior this Agreir-ent. i 
• 5 -
As an alternative rocaedy the SELLER may oloct to reduce^any Payment 
or a l l payments, accelerating and oaturing the^entlre balance of pHjjcioaJ and 
Interest Immediately, to Judgrcont or nay have said ranedy on one or aore sue-
cosslve cr Intermittent occasions or oay oloct to treat this Agroomont as a 
noto and oortgoge passing t i t l e through to the BUYERS ond foreclosing tho SCKO 
tn the oanner provided by lav. 
Curing the period tho GUYERS ere coa?lying with the terns of this 
Agreement, thay shalI ^ . o n t l t j ^ d jho Jhe sole, cxejusl vot_and J>&nof i.cial.jise-* 
occupancy, andjanjoypont of tho above described premises subject only to tho 
rights of the SELLER to Inspect the sarae at rossonsbie times. 
4. The BUYERS have inspected said preaises and find the suae in 2 
aannor satisfactory to thoa and thore are no covenants or warranties orhor 
than expressly set forth herein. 
5* Time shall be of the essence as to alt the terms and conditions of 
this Agreement vhich shall bind and inure to tho benefit of the heirs, sue* 
cessors, and assigns of the parties hereto 6nxi tho party in default agrees to 
pay a l l costs and a reasonable attorney's fee in the event enforcement of this 
contract is required. 
WITNESS the hands of the parties hereto this /& day of A , , 
<SZ 
XSUTm 
Elsie yuri iikornoft ^yCs 
SELLER 
,J Cioyd H. 2r\rMcrhp£Jr 
^ /?{£ J^f^f 
<r Q^^^^^^^i 
^Urx Brinkornoif /£/ 
OUTERS 
<f'r ^-yd'<Tir?S>' 
To whom It noy concern: 
VJS S M : — " - " " 
^Zi^fl ' gj^jfcJeJ, Signed: /A 
STATE OF UTAH ) SS. 
) 
County of Kane 
On this (4 h day of (Xb>^t. 
appeared before me Elsie 3rinkerhoff 
f , personally 
, the signer 
and foregoing instrument, who duly aekn. >wledsed 
of the above 
to me that she executed the same. 
\'<,,h(>. 5 .(l»A*, _ 
Notary Public 
• Residing at Jf£u-.xin-<k. UtT*A. 
PLAINTIFFS 
EXHIBIT 
M 
Reco/dad at Raqueat 0/ — 
•I M. FM Pud S 
« y _ OfP. -
Counry Rtcordtr 
800k. Paoa, Ret.; 
M«il tax notice to -Grantees Addre» .filftndalm. »rah —£,4223L 
WARRANTY DEED 
Elsie Srinkerhoff, a widow, 
of* GJendale , County 0/ Kane 
grantor 
( Statt of Utah, hereby 
CONVEY and WARRANT to ELSIE 8RINKERH0FF, a widow, MARK J . 8RINKERH0FF, a 
married man, and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, a married man, 
all as Joint Tenants with full rights of survivorship, 
and not as Tenants in Common, ti 
of Glendale, Utah 84729 
S10.00 & other valuable consideration-
UM foJJowinf described trice of land in KANE 
Staff of Utah: 
a/antac; 
for tht aim of J 
—-00LLAM, 
County, 
SEE SCHEDULE "A" ATTACHED HERETO ArtO 3Y THfS REFERENCE MADE A PART HEREOF. 
ill 
8.4 
2 3 3 
I 
Ql 
I rJ 
WITNESS, tha hand of said grantor , this 4 th dey 0/ 
Signed in the Pntence of 
June A. 0. 19 79 . 
* \% r 
Elsie 8rinkerhoff ^ ^ 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Kane 
) 
SS. 
On trie 4 th day of June A. 0., 19 79 
ippeireri before ma E l s i e 8 r i n k e r h o f f , a widow, 
the signer of the within instrument who duly acknowledged 
to me that S he executed the same. 
-..^->^..^,4^il 
James 8. Adair 
personally 
Notary Public 
uvrncMtfAM rrru et«r«af.#.# taiim m w 
My Commi»on expires —June 19 *.A319. My residence is.. --^StiSS^JU^a^JJ^L 
U l V t U a i M i a M i l - - - - . .. a • .. _ ^ 
DEFENDANTS 
EXHIBIT /K7 
SCHEDULE "A" 
PARCEL 1: .The West half of Section 25. Townshio 39 South, Ranqe 4S West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, contalninq 320.0 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 2: Tne Northwest Ouarter (NWS); the Southeast Ouarter (SES) and the 
South Half of the Northeast Ouarter (Sl/lEv«) of Section 26. Townshio 39 South, 
Ranoe *s West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing 400.0 acres, rare or less. 
PARCEL 3: Lots 1 , 2, 3, and 4; the Southeast Ouarter of the Northwest Ouarter 
(5EV<VS); the Northeast Ouarter of the Southwest Ouarter (NESSWH); the East Half 
of the East Half (ESES); the Southwest Ouarter of the Northeast Ouarter (SWVlES) 
and the Northwest" Ouarter of the Southeast Ouarter (NWHSES) of Section 27, 
Townshio 39 South, Range 4S West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing 478.80 
acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 4: The East Half of the Northeast Quarter (EV<ES); the South Half of 
the Southeast Ouarter (SSSES) and Northwest Ouarter of the Southeast Ouarter 
(NWHSEk) of Section 35, Townshio 39 South, Ranoe 4S West. Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, containing 200.0 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 5^  The Southwest Ouarter of the Northeast Ouarter (SWSNES); the West 
Half of the Southeast Ouarter (WSSES) and the Southeast Quarter of the Southwest 
Ouarter (SESSWS) of Section 29, Townshio 40 South, Ranqe 4S West, Salt Lake 8ase 
it\d Meridian, containing 160.0 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL' 6: The Northwest Ouarter (NVSj and the East Half of the Southwest 
Ouarter of Section 30, Townshio 40 South, Ranne 4S West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, containinn 238.99 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 7: Lot 2, Section S, Townshio 40 South, Range 4^ West, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian, containina 39.08 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 8: Tne Southwest Ouarter of the Northwest Ouarter (SW4NVH) of Section 
8, Townshio 40 South, Ranoe 4 West, Salt Lake Base and .Meridian, containing 
40.0 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 9: Lot 1 and the Northeast Ouarter of tne Northwest Ouarter (NESNWS) 
of Section 31 , Townshio 40 South, Ranoe 4^ West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
contalninq 79.30 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 10: BEGINNING at the North Quarter Corner of Section.26, Township 40 
South, Range 7 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South 
0*35' West S67.60 feet; thence South 78°00' East 963.6 feet ; thence North-
westerly along the creek bed, 808.0 fee t , more or less, to the North l ine of 
Section 26; thence South 09*57' West 741.18 feet to the point of beginning. 
Containing 11.77 acres, more or less, 
PARCEL 11: BEGINNING at the Southwest Comer of the Southwest Quarter of 
the Southeast Quarter of Section 23, Township 40 South, Ranged West, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence East 10.23 chains; thence North 
80* West 6.36 chains; thence West 3.68 chains; thence South L.O chain to the 
point of beginning. Containing 0.74 acres, more or less. 
• • • • •+ • • +• <»-+ • • 
?M 
i 
.*** 
Recorded it Request of — — 
it - . M. Fit Paid S -
BY 1 O t p . — 
. -• County Recorder 
Book 
Mail tai notice to 
Rage 
Address 
.... Ret.: 
WARRANTY DEED 
Elsie Brinkerhoff, a widow, 
of Slendale county of Kane 
grantor 
State of Utah, hereby 
CONVEY and WARRANT to * 60LDA B. ADAIR, a married woman, as to an undivided 1/5 
interest; WARREN 
BRINKERHOFF, a m a r r i e d man, as to an u n d i v i d e d 1/5 I n t e r e s t ; A RUNE B. GOULD ING, 
a m a r r i e d woman, as t o an u n d i v i d e d 1/5 I n t e r e s t ; CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF, a 
m a r r i e d man, as t o an undiv ided 1/5 I n t e r e s t and BETTY B. ESPLIN, a m a r r i e d 
woman, as to an undivided 1/5 Interest, oranttes 
of Ordervil le, Utah for the asm 
$10.00 l other valuable consideration -DOLLARS, m 
the following described tract of land in KANE r«.«*» • 
State of Utah: 
s! 
County, 
SEE SCHEDULE MA" ATTACHED HERETO ANQ BY THIS REFERENCE MAOE A PART HEREOF: 
» * * » 
i 
WITNESS, the hand of s»d frantor . this 15th day of August 
Signed in the Presence of 
A. 0. 19 80. 
^..ZL,*,^^^ 
Elsie Brinkerhoff *J 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Kane 
) 
) SS. 
J 
On the 15th day of August A. 0.. 13 80 personally 
appeared before me Elsie Brinkerhoff , a widow, 
the signer of the within insmiment who duly acknowledged 
to me that She executed the same. 
* James B. Adair Notary Public 
My Commiulon tspirts-~.Jui»t. W.«-J583.... — My residence h 0r.d.emJ.]*.^JU.t«A 
3SY 
r^ n 
DEFENDANTS 
EXHIBIT 
(o 
PAD_C_CL~ }: The W-^t ;>alf of Section :L<, V-. i : rr.c jJ South, Range 4'; West, 
SaVt L^e Base and Meridian, co'-taininc: v* . ; •••r-«.-*J% rore or less. 
PA.PC.-J-. j?L The Northwest nLartcr (NWh;; :*•' ^.uineust nuarter (SE\«) and the 
Sbuth~*HaTf of tne Northeast o0a~ter (SVl-.'J of Ac t ion ?6, Townshio 39 South, 
Ranoe 4;* West, Salt L*ke Base and Meridian, i.ontaininq 400.0 acres, more or less 
PARCEL. 3: Lots 1 , 2, 3, and 4; the Southear. b a r t e r of tlie northwest Quarter 
TS^NWvS;" the Northeast Quarter of the Soulhw,M b a r t e r (NEV»SWVi); the East Hall 
of the East Half [VA\)\ the Southwpst fh.*rtt.-r of the Northeast Quarter (SWy*E!«] 
and the Northwest b a r t e r of the Soutneabt b a r t e r (NW*SE*«) of Section 27, 
Townshio 39 South, Panqe 4v3 West, Salt Lake Eave and Meridian, containing 478.8C 
acres, nore or less. 
PARCEL 4: The East Half of the Northeast Q;.«»rvr (E!,NE\i); the South Half of 
the Southeast Quarter (SSSE^) and Northwest n..rtr:er of the Southeast Quarter 
(NWaSE\i) of Section 35, Townshio 39 South, *an'»c 4^ West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, containing 200.0 acrer>, more or less. 
PARCEJ. 5j_ The Southwest Quarter of the Nor:n<?ast Quarter (SVyiE*); the West 
HalToT the Southeast Quarter (w'-SEL) and the Southeast Quarter of the Southwesl 
Quarter (SE^SW^) of Section 29, Townshio 40 South, Ranqe 4S West, Salt Late Bas< 
and Meridian, containing 160.0 acres, more or less. 
PAR2LLA :. T h c Northwest Quarter (NW:«) and :.nc Last Half of the Southwest 
Quarter" of Section 30, Townshio 40 South, t'lnn** V2 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, containinr, 238.99 acres, more or le^s. 
PARCEL 7: Lot 2 , Section 5, Townshio 40 South, Ranrje 4S West, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian, containina 39.OR acres, more o» t^ss. 
PARCEJL 3:* .The Southwest Quarter of the NorthM*stJ'jarter (SWVNW>4) of Section 
ET TcwosTnn*f40 South, Ranoe 4 West, Salt ' /»(• Rase and Meridian, containing 
4O.0 acres, more or less. 
PARCCJL 9: Lot 1 anri the Northeast 'bar ter of -• t»- horr.hwest Ouarter {NEVNW1*) 
of ScV.Ton 3 1 , Townsniii 40 South, Ranoe 4\. We.4 , Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
containino 79.30 acres* wore or less. 
PARCEL 10: BEGINNING at the North Quarter Corner of Section 26, Township 40 
South', Range 7 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South 
04'35' West S67.60 fee t ; thence South 78°00' Fast 963.6 f e e t ; thence North-
westerly along the creek bed, S03.0 fee t , more or less, to the North l ine of 
Section 26; thence South 89°57' West 741.18 feet to the point of beginning. 
Containing 11.77 acres, more or less-
PW?CJL.Jii 3EGINNING at the Southwest Corner of the Southwest Quarter of 
the Southeast Quarter of Section 23, Township 40 South, Range 7 West, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence Fast 10.23 chains; thence North 
8 0 ' West 6.36 chains; thence West 3.68 chains; thence South 1.0 chain to the 
point of beginning. Containing 0.74 acres, more or less. 
V 
O^^Ll^U- HA.7., Z- Z. Ac .rl . ^Ij 
Elsie Brinkerhoff j£/ 
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
I, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF being an actual bona fide resident 
of Glendale, County of Kane, State of Ucah, being of sound and 
disposing mind and memory, knowing the objects of my bounty and 
not acting under any menace, fraud or undue influence, do hereby 
and by these presents make, publish and declare chis instrument 
as and to be my Last Will and Testament, hereby revoking any and 
all former Wills and Codicils thereto made by me at any time. 
FIRST 
I nominate Betty Esplin, Orderville, Utah., my daughter 
to act as Personal Representative of chis Will co serve without 
bond. 
SECOND 
I direct that my Personal Representative as soon after 
my demise as is practicable, co pay all my lawfully enforceable 
debts and all expenses of my last illness, funeral, and burial. 
THIRD 
I direct that my estate shall be distributed in seven 
(7) equal shares, one share co be distributed co each of my six 
children and one share to my daughter-in-law, Lena Brinkerhoff.' 
My children are: Mark Brinkerhoff, Glendale, Utah; 
Golda Adair, Orderville, Utah; Warren Brinkerhoff, St. George, 
Utah; Arlene Golding, Glendale, Utah; Charles Brinkerhoff, 
Orderville, Utah; Betty Esplin, Orderville, Utah and my 
daughter-in-law is Lena Brinkerhoff, surviving wife of Cloyd 
Brinkerhoff deceased. 
I direct that in any event that any one of the 
foregoing shall predecease me than the share that Chey would have 
taken shall go to their lineal descendants by right of 
representation per stirpes, and not per capica. 
DEFENDANTS 
EXHIBIT 
/3 
FOURTH j 
I also represent that I may at so tut; time in the future ! 
prepare a written list of items of personal use, ornament, or 
effect which may dispose of items of a personal nature but will | 
not include real estate, securities, money deposits or ! 
receivables but will only dispose oi items of personal property | 
exclusive of the enumerated exceptions foregoing. I direct tha.t 
if such a list is prepared by me dated ana signed than the 
articles of personal property which are thus disposed shall be j 
distributed to the recipienr without any further direction or j 
proceeding. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF 1 have r.u-.di . published and declared j 
this instrument as and to be my Last Will ar.u 'les tar::ent in the j 
p r e s e n c e of Phvilis C. Espiin ^^ Cecelia H> Chamberlain , \ 
attesting witnesses, who witness and attest the same in my sight j 
and in my presence at Orderville , Utah, this 23rd day of j 
April , 1982. 
Elsie Drinkerholi 
On this' 23rd day of April 198 2, the i 
foregoing instrument, consisting of TWO (1) pages:, including this , 
page, was in the presence of us, and each of us, made, signed, , 
published and declared by the TESTATRIX, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, as ; 
and to be her Last Will and Testament, who in the sight and | 
presence of each other, do hereby subscribed our names as | 
attesting witnesses, which said Last Will and T-estament was 
executed by the TESTATRIX ELSIE BRINKERHOFF in our sight and in 
o-ur presence and declared by said TESTATRIX ELSIE BRINKERHOFF to 
be her Last Will and Testament, she requesting chat we act as j 
subscribing witnesses and we. and each ot us, do hereby certify
 : 
and declare that in our opinion che TESTATRIX ELSIE BRINKERHOFF j 
~ 3 -
is of sound and disposing mind and memory and not acting under 
any menace, fraud, or undue influence. 
Address: 
Address: 
I, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, the TESTATRIX, sign my name to 
this instrument this 23rd day of April , 1982 , and being 
first duly sworn, do hereby declare to Che undersigned authority 
that I sign and execute this instrument .as my Last Will and I 
Testament and I sign it willingly; that I execute it as my free j 
and voluntary act for the purposes therein expressed and that I j 
am eighteen years of age or older, of sound mind, and under no ! 
constraint or undue influence. 
i 
i 
I 
I 
£lsie Brinkerhoff , V \ 
i 
WE, P h y l l i s C. Espl in and Cece l i a H. Chamberlain , t h e 
witnesses, sign our names to th is instrument, being f i r s t duly 
i 
sworn, and do hereby declare to the undersigned authority that j 
the TESTATRIX ELSIE BRINKERHOFF signs and executes this | 
instrument as her Last Will and Testament and she signs it I 
willingly and each of us, in the presence and hearing of the 
TESTATRIX ELSIE BRINKERHOFF and of each other, hereby sign this ' 
Will as witnesses to the TESTATRIX'S signing, and that to the 
best of our knowledge the TESTATRIX ELSIE BRINKERHOFF is eighteen 
years of age or older, of sound mind, and under nc constraint or j 
undue influence. j 
z 
< 
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ji STATE OF UTAH ) 
l| COUNTY OF Smim Kane ) 
i! 
I; S u b s c r i b e d , sworn co and acknowledged b e f o r e me by 
II ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, t h e TESTATRIX, ana s u b s c r i b e d and sworn co 
ii 
Defore me by Phyll is C. Ssplin and Cecelia H. Chamberlain , 
ii 
!
, w i t n e s s e s , t h i s 23rd day of April , 1 *^ 8 2. 
N o t a r v P u b l i c 
ji R e s i d i n g At : Ordervi l le . Utah 
My Commission E x p i r e s : May 7, 1985 
BISHOP & RONNOW, P.C. 
Willard R. Bishop 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P. 0. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-9483 
IN THB SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP KANE COUNTY, 
STATB OP UTAH 
MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of CLOYJ) H. BRINKERHOPF, 
LENA BRINKERHOFF, and MARK J. 
BRINKERHOPF, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. 
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, 
ARLENE B. GOULDING, and JOHN 
DOES I through V, 
Defendants. 
STIPULATION 
Civil No. 1826 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, Defendant in the above-entitled action, 
agrees and stipulates as follows: 
1. That the certain agreement dated October 26, 1966 
(hereinafter "Agreement" attached as Exhibit "A"), executed by 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, Seller, and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF and MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF, Buyers, together with any other agreement containing 
substantially the same terms, is a valid and binding contract 
which she executed without coercion, and with full knowledge and 
understanding of its provisions and duties. 
2. That she agrees to conform to the terms of the Agreement, 
and perform all conditions and duties provided and imposed 
thereunder, including specific performance on her part. 
PLAINTIFFS 
EXHIBIT 
40 
3. That she recognizes she improperly attempted to convey 
land to others contrary to the terms of the Agreement, and hereby 
repudiates a certain Warranty Deed dated June 4, 1979, (Exhibit 
"B") purporting to convey to ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF, and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, as Joint Tenants, the same 
property conveyed under the Agreement, and further repudiates any 
other deeds or instruments of conveyance which have the effect of 
divesting or in any way diminishing the right, title, and 
interest of buyers and their wives, in the property specified in 
the Agreement. 
4. That she acknowledges the receipt of $2,000 from the 
Buyers, and/or their heirs, HARK J. BRINKERHOFF and LENA A. 
BRINKERHOFF, for the 1983 payment pursuant to the terms of the 
Agreement. 
5. That she forgives and waives all rights to any and all 
delinquent amounts currently due under the Agreement. 
6. That she recognizes the validity of a certain affidavit 
dated April 13, 1971, (attached as Exhibit "C") , and reaffirms 
the statements contained therein and further agrees to cooperate 
and assist Plaintiffs in the litigation of their claims against 
other named Defendants in the above-entitled action. 
7. That her Amended Counterclaim against the Plaintiffs and 
her Crossclaim against MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, as filed in this 
action, shall be dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits. 
8. That the Court shall enter a decree of specific 
performance against her. 
( . ?: 
In consideration for the Stipulation specified above, 
Plaintiffs hereby stipulate as follows: 
\ . Plaintiffs will not seek any award of damages against 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF under their Second Amended Complaint. 
2. Plaintiffs will reimburse Defendants, GOLDA B. ADAIR, 
WARREN BRINKERHOFF, and ARLENE B. GODLDING for the amounts paid 
to ELSIE BRINKERHOFF for the purported transfer of properties 
specified under the Warranty Deed dated June 4, 1979, Exhibit 
"B-, in return for the said Defendants1 Agreement to drop all 
their claims filed in the above-entitled lawsuit and dismiss the 
same with prejudice. If said Defendants do not dismiss said 
claims before 20 September 1984, Plaintiffs shall be under no 
obligation of reimbursement. 
3. That the above-entitled Court may enter its Order and 
judgment in conformance with this Stipulation and Plaintiff's 
prayer for relief as specified in their Second Amended Complaint. 
DATED this O^- day of September, 1984. 
i?Jk<L^ j i i / ^ w 
ELSIE BRJSKERHOFF / V 
STATE OF OTAH ) 
:ss. 
County of ^^ ) / / 
f>3-
 A v*S>uL. A. On the 7 day of ^^^-fC^S2~L\ , 1984, personally 
appeared before roe ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, Defendant named in the 
t 
-3-
above-entitled action, the signer of the above and foregoing 
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that she executed the 
same. 
mg at: / 
^TCta^f 
DATED this [UTL*- day-.of Sept 
WILLARD R. BISHOP v 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ 
STATE OF UTAfl 
ss. 
County of ) 
On the /0zA day of \SjLtih#7^LuAs , 1 984, personally 
appeared before me WILLARD R. BISHOP, attorney for Plaintiff 
ANDERSON in the above-entitled action, the signer of the above 
and foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he 
executed the same. 
/) 
'-tfOTARY PUBLIC, r e s i d i n g a t ; / x r^k\ x t v u u - L ' w , i. *-. »s -»• y-k. A * w t* w • 
C&dtAfiy,/ //J P/ZJQ 
My Commission e x p i r e s : 
^P ijJMsftJ P7 
C :•; 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing STIPULATION to Mr. Hans Q. 
Chamberlain, CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE, Attorneys at Law, 110 North 
Main Street, Suite G, Cedar City, Utah 84720, by first class 
mail, postage fully prepaid this day of , 
1984. 
j . 
Vr 
c^  
»*. » .5 e ,*. 
^ *? ,"•-;•/; j , ^ -
A 6 R C E M C H T ^ ( \ w 
T1<!S K&£ZHZm, *od* and ontcrod Into by and bot^coo EISIC ^IMXIRHCrrJ 
of Glondolo, Covnty of fono, State of Utah, PARTY OF TIC FIRST PART, horcln-
a f t e r roforrod to as tho "SELLER" and CLOTD H. GRW.'CS-OFF and MAHS inj:i)CRi&"F 
of Glondalo, County of fcino. State of Utah, PARTIES OF THZ SECOfO P-ST, r * r e l n -
a f to r reforrod to as tho "UTTCRS", 
K j B T ] l £ 2 i £ I i i : 
THAT W>ERSA5# tho SritCR Is the ©wicr of tho res I property, ^rnrinr 
privi leges ond water r ights Ir. tho Slalcs of Utah end \r\zor^; 
AJO VKCREAS, tho QJYERS dssiro to p-jrcLaso tho s^rte; 
AIO YrHEREAS, tho pcr t le * hevo agreed upon tcr^s ond condi 1! *ns isr th, 
sale tl>orcof; 
KCW TJCRCFCr^!, In consideration of tho D.-cnlscs zr\6 of t.-e T,-;?U2I 
covor.o-.ts and agnxnenvo hereinafter set a i t the pnrtler. hereinafter Licrco * I T ; I 
and bct»ocn ono another as follows: 
t« Thot for ond In ccnsicerotlon of the totol su*n of FIFTY "}&Z 
T.ICUSAiO TWEE HUCftED EIGHTY-EIGHT (*53,3eS,0D> DOLLARS, as t:^o fu l l consider::-! 
i 
t lon thorofor, tho SELLER covenants cr\4 agrees to ce i l and tho BUYERS covenant 
end egroo to buy tho fol loving doscribed rool property, grsztng privilege? ^nc 
voter ond reservoir r ights In tho Ststoo of Utah znd Arizona: 
REAL PROPERTY lit MILLARD COUTHY, UTAHt 
Lois 1 , 2, 3, and 4, Clock 25, Plat "A", Delta Tawnclt*. 
l o t 2, Block 26, Plot "A", Dalta Towel to 
HEAL PROPERTY IN ICVJC CXWTY, UTAH: 
Township 19 Ssuth, Ron go 4{ Kost, Sslt L;:!:o IVcrldior.; 
Vest IJolf oi Section 2!?, containing 320 acres. 
Ifcxiht-cst Cw'-jr^or; Sojthesst g a r t e r ond the South K J H 
0< 1">J Lrrl '.^DST o . ! 3^c r cr rs t r l nlr.g 0 3 s * r c : , a l l In 
Sect ion : v ; , ToKnr.Mp ;„•,' S j u t n , R«i«-w9 4f V.*st, Sa l t toko 
Mr.rl c l an , con jo in i ng 0 3 ac rc r , t o ' e or loss. 
l o t * I , ?, 3, zr\d /.; S>jt!-.o.TSt C A ^ r t u r o» tho Jir.rth-
vest \ u - : r t n r ; »;>"ti.^.ict Iv inr tcr o i tnc S->jtn-..esT 
sva r l u r ; U o t MJ If of I'-.o Cc-i' K ; ; f ; $.^..*!»ifcs? u u r t c r 
O^  ^ c ! . . . . -<-^^ t ^ - U - r ; ;;-rrrrv.crt ' / . j r o r of t ; ^ 
SJ-.I*'-.: c l '\\-„r~.er o{ r i 11 • o*> r.', ^r-^»-:"-M-• i> rool r . , 
lt-.--p ^ i V v . t , c o n : r i : i n c -7C-.0D cc ros . 
iT V ' j r 0 7 y M * ! i I .— I - . 
t A
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East Half of the Northoast Quarter; South «al f of the 
Southeast (H^'rtor; Nort Inmost Charter of the Southeast 
Quarter of Section 35 , containing 203 acres. 
Township 40 South, Range 41 West, Sol t Lako Meridian: 
Section 70i Southvost Quarter of tho Northeast Quarter; 
Kost Halt of the Southeast Charter and tho Southeast Quarter 
of the Southwest Quortcr, containing 160 acres. 
Section 30: Northwost Quarter; East Itelf of tho Southwest 
Quartor, containing 233.59 acres. 
Section 5: l o t 2 , containing 3 - . 03 acres. 
Township 40 South, Range 4 best . Sal t Lake Meridian: 
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 8 f 
containing 40 ceres. 
Township 40 South, Range 7 West. Sa l t Laiie Meridian: 
Dog!fining a t tho Southvost Cornor of the Southwest Quartor of 
tho Southeast Quartor of Section 23, Township 40 South, Ranro 
7 ttost, Sa l t take Moridlen and running thonce East 10,23 
chains; thonco North 60* V.'ost 6.36 chains; thence Wost 3.6o 
chains; thense Sooth 1 chain to beginning, containing .74 
acres. 
Beginning a t the Northwest Cornor of tho Northwest Quarter o t N 
the Northeast Quartor of Section 26, Township 40 South, Ringo 
7 Best, and running thence South 4,30 chains; thence South 70* 
East 15 chains to tho middle of the channel of the creek; thonco 
North*estorly along the mlddlo of the channel of sold creek to 
the North Lino of said NorthKOSt Quartor of tho northeast 
Quarter; thonco West 11.23 chains to tho place of beginning. 
Doglnnlrg 4.30 chains South of the Northwest Corner of the 
Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quartor of Section 2CP 
Township 40 South, flange 7 kost, Sa l t Lako World!en and run-
ning thonco South 70* East 15 chains to tho middle of tho 
channol of the creek; thonco Southerly along tho middle of 
the channel of said creek to tho South Line; thonco North 
73*45' Kcst 14.CO chains; thonco North 4.30 chains to tho 
place of beginning, containing 5,60 acres. 
The above throe tracts being part of land si tuated In Sactlons 
23 ond 2t of said township and range, souetlcacs roiorrod to 
uno f f i c ia l l y as Lot "A". 
Township 40 South, Bono* 4$ Kost, Sa l t Lake Moridlen: 
Lot 1 ; Nar tVns t Quartor of tho Northwest Cuortor of Section 
31
 # containing 73.30 acres. 
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PERSCKAL PR0PCR77! 
N\ The following described voter and reservoir r igh ts : 
A one-fourth Intorest In Hobblo Canyon Reservoir (9 -26 -1D 
In Monovo County, Arizona, 
A on* half Interest In Su l l l v jn Rcoorvolr In f-tohovo County, 
Arizona. 
And a l l grazing prlvl 10305 anC porolt^ annoyed to or b-'sod 
open any of the vorogoing r c o l , personal, reservoir , or u^cor 
r ights 05 co.t>on£urcto. 
2. The parties sgree thct for and In cons!doration of the LO\O by tho 
SELLER to the OTTERS of tho foregoing real and personal property, -..-;, tor ^nd 
reccrvolr r ights and grazing pr iv l logos, tho BUYERS wl I I pay to tno SELLER tho 
SU3 of TWO TOOJSA^D ($2,000.00) DOLLARS, coch yosr, beginning v i l l i live l e t c'jy 
of Hovtnoor, 1964, of *hich paytnonts duo on fJovc-nbor 1 , 1964 *r\d UD.<G-n}.*cr 1 , 
r;C5 aro hereby acknowledged by tho SELLER Inn tho BUYERS and the KSfZCS * i u 
continue to pay annual Installments of $2,000.00 on tho 1st doy of Xz,\en'jcr In 
each year thereafter beginning Novc^bor 1 , 1966 &f\4 continuing during the cnt i r^ 
IIfo of tho SELLER* 
The OUTERS ogros H>ot they n i l I pay the sum of 52,000,00 per yo:>r to 
tho SELLER for tho ent i re rooalnoor of SELLER'S l i f e irrespective of the «*nount 
nhlch ©ay be paid undor this contract whether I t exceeds the t o t a l consideration 
hereinabove sot out or vhethor tl iat to ta l amount shotl not be paid by applying 
annual parents of 52 ,OX.00 against the purcSaco pr ic * d jr lng the l i f e ti-no of 
i 
the SELLER and In cone!derotion of on undertaking by the OLYERS to py; tho J 
j 
asvount of $2,000.00 por year for the I f f e of tho SELLER I r res p o e t i c of tho 
! 
03Dunt which r*sy be psld, t)"S SELLER w ives Intorost upon t ! * unsold Lo!:rw-es. ; 
1 
I t I t provided, h^»^vor, that S'-Ould tho t s t i f cc»r.$i ooratlon heroin- ! 
ctov-e provided ftot be paid by tr»o BJfLFS to tho SELLER during SELLER'S Nfcfi.-aoi 
1 
tSsn uf->on tt*e 605th of the SELLER cr.y amounts rerr-iinir^ ur>^ar t r . I : A ~recrr.cn J- j 
af ter credit ing a i l ;»5,->^r.tt *hlch r-o.-c S>» r^ d-o S c r > . ^ ^ r , w a l l t-v ;-2ld 
&n-.vA!!y c» prcv!-J>d v>o,~v!n I r. >^.*f r-^res, c'orcr ft<*»^ i^ors c.Mko, to 
f. • - c 
ttarren Brlnkorhoff and Charley Arlend Brlnkorhoff two-sovenths (2 /7ths) t l / 7 ths 
to each) of tho balances Co* ( I t bolng st ipulated t t o t the OUTERS together with 
ttarron DWnkerhoff, Charloy Arlond Brlnkorhoff, Batty 0 . Espl ln , Golda B. Adair#| 
and Arlono B. Gouldlng const i tute a l t the holrs a t law of the SELLER and that 
other provision has been code for the la t tor thrco narood ho l rs ) , together k i t ; 
Interest at four (4J?) por cont per annua on the deferred declining balances. 
The BUYERS soy, a t any t l o o , prepay a l l or any part of tho regaining 
principal duo undor t h i s contract , 
3 . The SELLER shal l execute a Warranty Deed to the real property 
hereinabove described and quitclaim conveyances to the water and rcsorvolr 
r ights hcrelnefove described, of en undivided one half Interest to ooch BUYER 
and his wife as Joint tenants with f u l l r ights of survivorship, and shal l 
deposit said instruments In tho Hurricane Branch of the Bonk of S t . George 
which shall hold those doctroonts In t r u s t and In escrow-subjoct to the fol loUnnj 
ESCROW IHSmCTlOHS 
I f the BUYERS shal l sake a l l payments of principal and Intorost herein 
provided and perform a l t the offtor covenants and agreements heroin contained, 
then upon payment of the f i n a l Instal lment due hereunder the Escrow Depository 
shal l del lvor to the BUYERS a l l the escrowed documents. 
In the ovent of a defaul t In the payment of any Installment of prlncipol| 
or Intorost and In. the c\tmt of a defaul t In any other term or condition heroin 
end In tho event notice of a default other than for payrnont of principal and 
Interest shall be g!von to tho BUYERS by the SELLER and a subsequent fai lure 
to remedy tho $*rae shall contlnuo for a period of t h i r t y (30) days, tho* the 
SELLER oay# at her option, demand a redelivery to her of e l l of the oscrtrred 
documents vhoreupon the OUTERS w i l l vacate and peaceably surrender o i l of the 
premises hereinabove described and the SELLER »3y re-enter Into possess I on ct 
tho tone without further process and «ay re ta in aa rent and l\ qui dated denvogos 
a l l Kirns tJorotofore pcid by BUYERS undor thic Agroenont. 
•s-
As an a l te rna t ive rmedy the SELLER asy olcct to roduco any payment 
or a l l payments, accelerating and oaturlng the ont l re balance of prlncloal and 
Interest JnraedJatoly, to juCVrvoot or nay hovo said rcrrody on ono or core suc-
cessive or Intermit tent occasions or ojy e l e c t to t roat th is Agroorrjent as a 
note ond oort^ago passing t l t l o through to the BJf&RS ond -foreclosing tho sc/io 
In the sinner provided by l a * . 
Curing the parlod tito BUYERS are complying with tho terrns of t.Ms 
Agreement, they shall bo e n t i t l e d to the sole , exclusive, and bonoflcial use, 
occupancy, *nd onjoyoent of tho above descrlbod pnwlses subject only to tho 
r ights of the SELLER to Inspect tho sarso a t rarson^le t imes. 
4 . The BUYERS have Inspected said pretalsos and f ind the s**ac in a 
aannor sat isfactory to thea and thore are no covenants or warranties orhvr 
than expressly set for th heroin. 
5. Time shal l bo of the essence as to a l l the terms ond conditions of 
th is Agreement which shal l bind end Inure to tho boneflt of tho he i rs , suc-
cessors, and assigns of the parties hereto and the party In default agrees to 
pay a l l costs and a reasonable attorney's foo In the ov«nt enforcement of th is 
contract Is r e h i r e d . 
Vf|77£SS the hands of the parties hereto th is /& day of „ A c , , 
/&? 
15211. >/ 
•2f/ • ••' ^ • £ -" 
Els ie i ir lnkornoff pCs 
^ SELLER 
C -'J - ; , f . • ' £>- KtL^J-'r/!-// 
Cioyd H. Drlr.iicrroO 
kjrK l3rir.KoriiO\l /// 
/ 
BUYERS 
/•'- ±<y*'<--•"• 
SCHEDULE "A* 
PAPCEL 1: The west naif of Sectior 2$, To*nshio 39 South. Rer.ce 4- nest. 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, contammq 3?0.0 acres, rore or less 
PAECEL 2: The Northwest Ogarter (MW\); the Southeast Ow*rter (SE*.! a^d the 
South Half of the Northeast b a r t e r (SViE1.} cf Section 26. TcwnsMc 39 South. 
Ranot 4S west. Salt Lake Base and Meridian, cor.taminq 400.C acres, nyrt or less. 
^ARCEl 3: tots I . 2, 3, and 4; the Southeast Ouarter of the Northwest Quarter 
[SEV<A); the Northeast Quarter of the Southwest b a r t e r (NE^SA); the East Half 
of the East Half (ESESh the Southwest b a r t e r of the Northeast Ouarter (SANS*) 
it%4 the Northwest Ogarter of the Southeast Ouartc (NASEH) of Section 27, 
Townshio 39 South, Range 4S West. Salt Lake Base md p r i d i a n , containing 478.80 
acres. «ore or less. 
PARCEL 4: The East Half of the Northeast Quarter (ESN£i|); the South Half of 
in* Southeast b a r t e r (SSSE^) and Northwest firmer of the Southeast Ogarter 
(NASE\) of Section 35. Townshio 39 South, Ranoe 4^ West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, containing 200.0 acres. «ore or less. 
PARCEL 5. The Southwest b a r t e r of the Northeast Ogarter (SW'WEH); the West 
Half of the Southeast Ouarter (ASE**) ind the Southeast Ogarter of the Southwest 
b a r t e r (SE*iSW'\) of Section 29. Townshio 40 South. Ranqe 4S West, Salt lane Base 
and p r i d i a n , containing 160.Q *cres, more or less. 
PARCEL 6: The Northwest Ogarter (NA) and the East Hal/ of the Southwest 
Ogarter of Section 30, Townshio 40 South, Ranne t\ West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, containinn 238.99 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 7: lot 2. Section S, Townshio 40 South, 3ange 4w west, Salt Lake Base 
and p r i d i a n , containinc 39.08 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 8: Tne Soutr.w^st Ogarter of the Northwest Ogarter ( S A N A ) of Section 
8. Townshio 4C South, Ranoe 4 West, Salt Lake Ease and .Meridian, containing 
40.0 acres, <nore or less. 
PARCEL 9: tot I and the Northeast Ogarter of tne Northwest Ogarter !NEV<A) 
of Section 31 , Tcwnshin 40 South, Ranoe 4*, West. Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
containinq 79.30 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 10: BEGINNING at the North Quarter Comer of Section 26, Township 40 
South, Range 7 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South 
0*35' West 567.60 feet ; thence South 78°00* East 963.6 fee t ; thence North-
westerly along the creek bed, 808.0 fee t , more or less, to the North l ine of 
Section 26; thence South 09*57* West 741.18 feet to the point of beginning. 
Containing 11.77 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL I I : BEGINNING at the Southwest Corner of the Southwest Quarter of 
the Southeast Quarter of Section 23, Township 40 South, Ranged West, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence East 10.23 chains; thence North 
30* West 6.36 chains; thence West 3.68 chains; thence South L.C chain to the 
point of beginning. Containing 0.74 acres, more or less. 
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e*r 
S * * i - i # ? t( B.tC.BJ 0/ — 
t( w FH plC $ — 
*y : • : 
Ml J ux nctci tc IZZZIZSZ.. 
Counry P.tca.'cr 
Boot 
Addreu .. 2i.gLdd.le*. iLLn._.£4723. 
WARRANTY DEED 
Elsie E n ^ e r r o f f . a widow, 
o< Glenca", e . Counr> of Kar.e 
gr-intor 
. Stan of 'Jti\ Kinby 
CONVEY v * WARRANT to ELSIE BRINKERHQFF, a wicow, MARK J. BRi.NKEP.HCFF, a 
marHed nan, ir\d ClQYC .".. BRiNKERHOFF, a marked man, 
a l l as Joint Tenants with fu l l rights of survivorship, 
and not as Tenants in Common, Oi 
anntMi J 
of Glendale, L'tan 5*729 • • for t^ ^m of S 
$10.00 & other valuable consideration -COLLARS. *| 
;** ioi;?w»^ i«cr :*2 tricfc of i*nd in KANE C&unry, I 
Suti o< Utin ! 
SEE SCHED'J.L "A" ATTACHED HERETO AND 3Y THIS REFERENCE WOE A PAP:7 H£3£0". 
WITNESS, :?* h*nc of u*c gnntor 
S*9n«d »/i ;M P-««nci of 
thu 4 th div of June . A. 0. 18 7 9 . 
* ~tisL>L<~sJn si u^''&&\y*^cz'>' 
j Elsie Brinkerhoff /Fpr 
STATE 0? U'AH 
CooAtY oi ^ane 
a*v Z*m~ -•-•-<<• «i~ « • 
) 
) SS. 
) 
On I M 4tn 5JY of June A C. 19 75 
ip;f»;ef ti'c.i .-ni Els-e Brinke^noff, a widow, 
:wr i-v^ff of :*i *tih»r. .-nr^rent *ho *u:> irir.c-w »c^d 
;: .-e '.*•*; $ nt fA*cu:ec tiw>i ami . 
.. ^ S . T > 7 _ Z ' . ^ t S L ^ k 
Jaf^ es B. Aoatr 
Otrior.aiiv 
Ne:«> Pu&iic 
.-•€ IS... 1S79. y>
 ;«.cmcf « J L ^ y J ^ ^ . ^ 
^ i f ^ v s r " E*Ub,> ft 
4* E b ^ k V f MO 
PARTNERSHIP STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated 48-1-6 (1953) . 
PARTNER AGENT OF PARTNERSHIP AS TO ' PARTNERSHIP 
BUSINESS — Every partner is an agent of the 
partnership for the purpose of its business, and the 
act of every partner, including the execution in the 
partnership of any instrument for apparently carrying 
on in the usual way the business of the partnership 
of which he is a member, binds the partnership, 
unless the partner so acting has in fact no authority 
to act for the partnership in the particular matter 
and the person with whom he is dealing has knowledge 
of the fact that he has no such authority. 
Utah Code Annotated 48-1-9 (1953) . 
PARTNERSHIP CHARGED WITH KNOWLEDGE OF OR NOTICE TO 
PARTNER — Notice to any partner of any matter 
relating to partnership affairs, and the knowledge of 
the partner acting in the particular matter, acquired 
while a partner or then present to his mind, and the 
knowledge of any other partner who reasonably could 
and should have communicated it to the acting 
partner, operates as notice to or knowledge of the 
partnership, except in the case of a fraud on the 
partnership committed by or with the consent of that 
partner. 
